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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(4)(b) and 
20A-4-406. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1; Did the District Court err in (1) allowing Gary Herbert ("Herbert") to file 
a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, in lieu of an answer to Steven G. Maxfield's ("Maxfield") 
complaint brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402; and (2) hearing Herbert's 
motion to dismiss without holding an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner's complaint. 
Standard of Review: "[A] district court's interpretations of Utah statutes and rules 
of procedure are questions of law reviewed for correctness." In re Irrevocable Jack W. 
Kunkler Trust v. Key Bank, 2011 UT 7, ^ 13, 246 P.3d 1184. A district court's 
"management of its docket and trial schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, lj 12, 214 P.3d 865. 
Issue 2: Did the District Court err in granting Herbert's Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
where (a) suits by a registered voter based on alleged violations of Utah's election code 
may only be pursued by the office of the Attorney General, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
20A-1-703, (b) Herbert was eligible at the time of the election, and (c) Herbert has never 
been convicted of an offense under Utah's election code. 
Standard of Review: "Whether a court properly granted a 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss is a question of law, which [is] review[ed] for correctness." Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, If 19, 258 P.3d 539. In reviewing the dismissal, 
courts "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those facts and 
-1-
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all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-
moving party." Oakwood Vill, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101,19, 104 P.3d 
1226. A court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal 
ground or theory apparent on the record, even if it differs from that stated by the trial 
court.55 Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29,110, 232 P.3d 999 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
PRESERVATION BELOW 
Herbert does not dispute that Maxfield preserved the issues for appeal. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Const. Art. VII, $ 3: 
(1) To be eligible for the office of Governor or Lieutenant Governor a person shall 
be 30 years of age or older at the time of election. 
(2) To be eligible for the office of Attorney General a person shall be 25 years of 
age or older, at the time of election, admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, and in good standing at the bar. 
(3) To be eligible for the office of State Auditor or State Treasurer a person shall 
be 25 years of age or older at the time of election. 
(4) No person is eligible to any of the offices provided for in Section 1 unless at 
the time of election that person is a qualified voter and has been a resident citizen of the 
state for five years next preceding the election. 
Utah Code: 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-4-401 to -406, set forth in the Addendum. 
former Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703 (2010), set forth in the Addendum. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
former Rule 1 (2011), set forth in the Addendum. 
Rule 7, set forth in the Addendum. 
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Rule 12, set forth in the Addendum. 
Rule 81, set forth in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final order by the Honorable James Brady of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court in Millard County (the "District Court") dismissing appellant 
Steven G. Maxfield's ("Maxfield") election contest action against appellee Gary Herbert 
("Herbert"), brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402(l)(b). The District Court 
determined that allegations of misconduct under the election code must be pursued 
through the procedures set forth in § 20A-1-703, and not § 20A-4-402. Further, the 
District Court found that Herbert was eligible to run for governor. On these bases, the 
District Court ruled that Maxfield had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Maxfield asks this Court to reverse Judge Brady's decision. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
1. Procedural History. 
On December 23, 2010, Maxfield filed an election petition with the District Court, 
alleging that Herbert and fellow gubernatorial candidate Peter Corroon ("Corroon") had 
violated Utah's campaign reporting requirements contained in Utah's election code. (See 
generally R. 1-17.) As such, they were alleged to be ineligible as candidates for governor 
under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402(l)(b). (Id.) Based on these alleged violations, 
Maxfield requested that the District Court disqualify Herbert and Corroon as candidates 
and declare Maxfield's running mate, Farley M. Anderson, winner of the election for 
-3-
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governor. (R. 4, 17.) Anderson allegedly received the third-highest number of votes. (R. 
4.) 
On January 3, 2011, Judge Derek P. Pullan, citing Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-404, 
assigned the case to Judge Brady and set a hearing on the matter for January 19,2011. 
(R. 60-61.) That same day, the clerk of the Fourth District Court served the petition upon 
Herbert and notified him that he had five days to respond. (R. 40.) On January 5, 2011, 
Herbert responded by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).1 
(R.63.) 
Maxfield then filed three things. First, he filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that 
Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion was procedurally improper (R. 86). Second, he filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Herbert's motion to dismiss (R. 123). Third, Maxfield 
i 
filed a Request for Enlargement of Time for Hearing, requesting that the District Court 
devote a full day to the matter (R. 89-90.) In light of the pending motions and Maxfield's 
request for a full-day hearing, the District Court sent a notice to the parties on January 14, 
2011, changing the date of the scheduled hearing from January 19th to January 25th. 
(See R. 136, 245.) A few days later, on January 19, 2011, the District Court sent a further 
notice indicating that the hearing would deal only with the pending motions to dismiss. 
(R. 141.) 
i 
Corroon also responded with a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against him 
(R. 92). The court granted Corroon's motion. Maxfield has not appealed the District 
Court's grant of that motion in favor of Corroon. 
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On January 25, 2011, the District Court heard arguments on the motions to 
dismiss. (R. 253.) That same day, the District Court entered its order dismissing 
Maxfield's petition. (R. 179.) 
2. Disposition Below. 
In its order, the District Court first ruled that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
governed the case. (Id.) As a result, it held that Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion was a 
procedurally allowable response to Maxfield's petition. (Id.) The District Court then 
noted that the parties had agreed that (a) Herbert met the requirements of eligibility set 
forth in the Utah Constitution, (b) that he had not been determined to be in violation of 
the election code by any other District Court, and (c) he had not been convicted of a 
crime involving violations of the elections code. (R. 180, 182.) Thus, there were no 
allegations in the pleadings and "no evidence that [Herbert] was not eligible for the office 
at the time of the election." (R. 182.) Finally, the District Court ruled that any 
investigation and finding of an election code violation must "be pursued through the 
Attorney General's Office as provided by § 20A-1-703" and not by a private citizen 
under § 20A-4-402. (Id.) In dismissing Maxfield's claims, the District Court also 
awarded Herbert his attorneys' fees and costs he incurred in the action. (R. 183.) 
Following the District Court's determination, Maxfield filed a Motion for a New 
Hearing, Amendment of Judgment, and Relief from Judgment. (R. 187.) After the 
matter was fully briefed, the District Court affirmed its earlier ruling, with the exception 
of the awarded attorneys' fees. (R. 243.) The District Court found that attorneys' fees 
are not provided for under the statutes at issue. (Id.) This appeal by Maxfield followed. 
-5-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The basic facts of this case are simple and undisputed. However, some additional 
explanation of the quagmire of related cases is necessary to properly frame the issues for 
this Court. 
In 2010 Utah held a special election for the office of governor. Herbert ran in that 
election as the Republican nominee.2 (R. 67.) It is undisputed that Herbert was 
constitutionally eligible for office: he was 63 years old at the time of the election, had 
been a Utah resident for more than five years, and was a registered voter. (R. 67, 127.) It 
is also undisputed that there had been no determinations under Utah's election code (the < 
"Election Code") that would disqualify Herbert from office, nor had Herbert ever been 
convicted of a criminal offense that would disqualify him from being governor. (R. 253 
at pp. 39-40.) 
On September 21, 2010, Maxfield filed a petition with the Lieutenant Governor's 
office in which he alleged that gubernatorial candidates Herbert and Corroon, among < 
others, had failed to comply with campaign reporting requirements in violation of the 
Election Code. (R. 67-68.) (the "Lt. Gov. Petition"). Maxfield filed the Lt. Gov. Petition 
under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703.3 
< 
2
 Maxfield was also a participant in the 2010 election, running for the office of 
Lieutenant Governor alongside Farley M. Anderson, who was a gubernatorial candidate. 
(R. 125.) 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703(1) provides that "[a]ny registered voter who has 
information that any provisions of [the Utah Election Code] have been violated by any * 
candidate . . . may file a verified petition with the lieutenant governor." 
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On October 14, 2010, Maxfield filed a pro se Petition for Extraordinary Writ of 
Emergency Relief with the Utah Supreme Court (the "First Supreme Court Action"). 
{Id.) In the First Supreme Court Action, Maxfield asked the Court to order the 
Lieutenant Governor to forward the Lt. Gov. Petition to Utah's Attorney General, and to 
appoint outside counsel to bring suit against Herbert for violations of Utah's election 
laws. (Id) The following day, Maxfield filed another Petition for Emergency Relief in 
the same case, requesting that this Court order "Respondents to file all responses . . . 
within three days and that this court make its decision as early as possible." (Id.) On 
October 19, 2010, the Supreme Court dismissed both petitions and advised Maxfield that, 
"to the extent relief is available, the request for that relief should be sought as a 
declaratory judgment pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78B-6-401, et seq." (R. 69; Utah 
Supreme Court Order, Case No. 20100803-SC, Oct. 20, 2010.) 
On October 19, 2010, a day before the dismissal of the First Supreme Court 
Action, Maxfield, joined by another election candidate, Stephen K. Maxfield (Maxfield's 
father), filed a pro se petition with the Third Judicial District Court (Judge Paul G. 
Maughan) (the "Judge Maughan Action"). (R. 69, 126.) Maxfield brought the Judge 
Maughan Action under Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-404, and sought a declaratory judgment 
that various candidates, including Herbert, had violated Utah's election laws. (R. 69, 
126-27.) Notably, the allegations in the petition were exactly the same as those contained 
in the previously filed Lt. Gov. Petition. (R. 69.) 
On October 29, 2010, Maxfield filed two more pleadings with the Utah Supreme 
Court (the "Second Supreme Court Action" and the "Third Supreme Court Action," 
-7-
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respectively). (R. 69-70.) In the Second Supreme Court Action, Maxfield filed a Motion 
for Emergency Relief and Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, requesting that the Supreme 
Court order Judge Maughan to schedule an evidentiary hearing in the Judge Maughan 
Action. (R. 69.) In the Third Supreme Court Action, Maxfield—joined by Farley M. 
Anderson and Steven K. Maxfield—sought an emergency order preventing the "Lt. 
Governor and all those under his control" from counting or tallying the votes for various 
candidates, including Herbert, and from certifying the election results until the Judge 
Maughan Action was resolved. (R. 70.) In mid-December 2010, the Supreme Court 
denied relief in both actions.4 (R. 83-85.) < 
On December 23, 2010, Maxfield filed his complaint in the Fourth District, which 
is the case Maxfield now appeals (the "Fourth District Action"). (R. 1.) Although the 
Fourth District Action was brought under a different section of the Election Code than 
Maxfield cited in his previous actions, it is based on the same factual allegations that 
Maxfield asserted in the original Lt. Gov. Petition. (R. 1,4-11, 70.) * 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is not a complicated case. It requires only a straightforward interpretation of 
a few statutory provisions. Nevertheless, Maxfield goes to great lengths to conjure issues 
where none exist. Maxfield's arguments are meritless, and the District Court's order 
should be affirmed. 
4
 Following the dismissal of Maxfield's Third Supreme Court Action, Judge Robin 
W. Reese was assigned to the Judge Maughan Action. (3d Dist. Ct. Docket, Case No. 
100920163.) Judge Reese has since granted Herbert's motion to dismiss. (Id.) Maxfield * 
did not appeal that decision. 
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Maxfield first raised the factual allegations upon which this action is based in the 
Lt. Gov. Petition that he filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703. Maxfield was 
not content, however, to wait upon the action of the appropriate state officers. As such, 
he filed a host of actions asking courts to place him in the shoes of the Lieutenant 
Governor and the Attorney General so he could, by himself, prosecute Herbert's alleged 
wrongdoing. These actions have been brought under various sections of the Election 
Code, including §§ 20A-1-703, 20A-1-404, and 20A-4-402. Notwithstanding the 
different code sections Maxfield cites, all of his actions are based on the same alleged 
violations that he raised in his Lt. Gov. Petition. 
This appeal is yet another attempt by Maxfield to become Lieutenant Governor. 
Like the other actions he filed, Maxfield5 s requested relief should be denied. First, 
Maxfield's contention that an election contest petition cannot be answered with a motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim is baseless. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
expressly indicate that they apply to all court proceedings, except where their application 
would be clearly inapplicable. Second, Maxfield's procedural claims regarding the date 
on which the District Court held its hearing are meritless. While the Election Code does 
provide a date by which an election contest should be heard, the District Court acted 
within its discretion when it changed the date of the hearing in response to the pending 
motions to dismiss and Maxfield's request for a longer hearing. Further, even if the 
District Court did err in changing the date, Maxfield is not entitled to a reversal because 
he was not prejudiced by the scheduling change. 
-9-
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Third, turning to the merits of the case, this Court should affirm the District 
Court's dismissal for several reasons. 
1. Maxfield's petition must be dismissed because § 20A-4-402 does not allow 
a private right of action against candidates based upon alleged violations of 
the Election Code. Under the Election Code, if a registered voter becomes 
aware of a potential violation, he or she may file a petition with the 
Lieutenant Governor. Maxfield has done this, and, short of being given 
leave by the Attorney General under § 20A-1-703, he is not entitled to 
litigate those alleged violations in another forum or proceeding. < 
2. Maxfield's petition also fails because the office of governor is created by 
the Utah Constitution, and the eligibility requirements for that office are 
defined therein. 
3. Even if this Court were to accept Maxfield's argument that the eligibility 
requirements of a gubernatorial candidate include statutory requirements, 
Maxfield's petition still should be dismissed because it is premature. 
Herbert has never been found to have violated laws that would preclude his < 
candidacy for office. Such a finding would be a prerequisite to determining 
that he was ineligible. 
4. The District Court's dismissal of Maxfield's claims was not based on 
improper form, but rather on the substantive deficiencies of his petition. 
Legally, Maxfield is not entitled to relief based on any of the allegations < 
raised therein. 
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In short, Maxfield has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
Accordingly, the District Court's Order should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT'S PROCEDURES WERE NOT IMPROPER. 
Maxfield asserts on appeal that the District Court erred in allowing Herbert to 
respond to the complaint with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and in rescheduling an 
earlier hearing. Specifically, Maxfield asserts that the deadlines for responding to a 
complaint and for setting an evidentiary hearing are contained in Utah Code Ann. § 20A-
4-403, and that the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings brought 
under that statute. Maxfield is mistaken. 
"[A] district court's interpretations of Utah statutes and rules of procedure are 
questions of law reviewed for correctness." In re Irrevocable Jack W. Kunkler Trust v. 
Key Bank, 2011 UT 7, ^ 13, 246 P.3d 1184. Further a district court's "management of its 
docket and trial schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Clayton v. Ford Motor 
Co., 2009 UT App 154, ^  12, 214 P.3d 865. The District Court's interpretations and 
scheduling efforts were proper and should not be overturned. 
A. A Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Is Procedurally Allowed in the 
Context of Election Contests, 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides that the Rules "shall govern the 
procedure in the courts of the state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil 
nature, . . . and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules 
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81." 
-11-
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Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) (emphasis added). Rule 81, in turn, provides that the Rules "shall 
apply to all special statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature 
clearly inapplicable." Utah R. Civ. P. 81(a) (emphasis added). "In determining whether 
civil procedure rules generally apply to [statutory] proceedings, as well as whether a
 ( 
specific rule applies, [a court's] primary goal is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve."5 Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT 
App 56, Tf 14, 975 P.2d 481 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, a court 
should consider the plain language of the statute at issue, but should also interpret and 
apply the Rules of Civil Procedure liberally "where no prejudice or disadvantage to < 
anyone results." Id. 
Proceedings brought under § 20A-4-402 are subject to various statutorily imposed 
i 
procedural requirements.6 Notably, however, these rules do not address many important 
procedural issues that arise in litigation of this sort, such as the form of the answer or how 
« 
5
 This Court need not determine whether proceedings brought under Utah Code 
Ann. § 20A-4-402 are "special statutory proceedings" because, as explained infra, "even 
if they are, . . . the rules of civil procedure as a whole are not by their nature clearly 
inapplicable." Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, f^ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation { 
omitted). 
6
 For example, the contest must be brought "within 40 days after the canvass" 
(-403(l)(a)); specific information must be contained in the complaint, including "one or 
more of the grounds for an election contest specified in Section 20A-4-402" (-403(l)(b)); 
"[t]he respondent shall answer the petition within five days after the service"(-403(5)(c)); i 
a petitioner must reply to a counterclaim "within 10 days after service" (-403(5)(e)); and 
the chief judge shall set a date to hear and determine the contest "not less than 10 nor 
more than 30 days from the date the petition was filed" (-404(1 )(b)(ii)). Moreover, § 
20A-4-405 specifically provides that the "court shall enter judgment for costs against the 
party contesting the election if. . . the proceedings are dismissed for . . . insufficiency of ' 
pleading or proof.. . ." § 20A-4-405(l)(a)(i). 
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to serve it (addressed in Rules 5, 7, and 10 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure), how to 
raise counterclaims or bring in third parties (addressed in Rules 13 and 14), and, 
importantly, what a party's available defenses are and how those should be raised 
(addressed in Rules 8 and 12). Accordingly, the mere fact that the applicable statutes 
"do[] not contain—nor do [they] purport to contain—a complete set of procedural 
guidelines" indicates that the rules, including Rule 12, are not "inherently and obviously 
inapplicable . . . ." See Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, ^ 15.7 
Utah courts have recognized that responding to an election contest petition with a 
motion to dismiss is procedurally proper. See, e.g., Johnstun v. Harrison, 197 P.2d 470, 
472 (Utah 1948) (respondent answered an election petition contest, with a general 
Moreover, § 20A-4-405 specifically provides that the "court shall enter judgment 
for costs against the party contesting the election if. . . the proceedings are dismissed for 
. . . insufficiency of pleading or proof. . . . " § 20A-4-405(l)(a)(i). Thus, far from being 
clearly inapplicable, it appears that the legislature expressly considered that petitions 
might be dismissed based upon a party's failure to state a valid claim within its pleadings 
and provided that a defendant was entitled to his or her costs in such a situation. 
o 
Although these cases involved earlier provisions of Utah's election code, the 
provisions specifically governing election contests are substantially similar to those at 
issue in this case. One noteworthy difference, however, is that unlike the current code, 
which requires service of the complaint and then an answer within five days of service, 
see Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-403(5), the older versions contain no requirements for 
service or an answer, except that notice of the required hearing must be given to a 
respondent "at least five days before the [hearing]," Utah Code Ann. § 25-14-8 (1943). 
Thus, the inclusion of language requiring service of the complaint and an answer in later 
versions of the code merely seem to acknowledge the reality that respondents were 
answering these early petitions through demurrers, answers, and otherwise (in lieu of 
simply showing up at a hearing), rather than limiting the permissible ways that a party 
may "answer" a petition. 
-13-
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demurrer);9 Spear v. Marshall, 79 P.2d 15, 15 (Utah 1938) (same)); Payne v. Hodgson, 
97 P. 132, 134 (Utah 1908) (same)); Carbis v. Dale, 65 P. 204, 204 (Utah 1901) (same)); 
see also Thiele, 1999 UT App 56, ^ 16 (stating that "review of the . . . statute's plain 
language and [Utah courts'] past approval of the use of civil procedure rules,"
 { 
demonstrate that "the rules of civil procedure are not by their nature clearly inapplicable" 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Not only have courts held that motions 
to dismiss are proper responses to an election contest petition, one Utah court held that a 
defendant had waived certain defenses by not filing one. In Skewes v. Bliss, 196 P. 850 
(Utah 1921), the court specifically held that the respondent had waived his opportunity to < 
challenge the sufficiency of an election dispute because he answered the complaint with a 
traditional answer rather than by demurrer.10 Id. at 851. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applied to the District Court proceeding that 
Maxfield appeals. The rules themselves say so, as have Utah courts. This Court should 




 A general demurrer was "[a] pleading stating that although the facts alleged in 
the complaint may be true, they are insufficient for the plaintiff to state a claim for relief 
. . . " and are now generally "termed a motion to dismiss." Black's Law Dictionary 465 
(8th ed. 1999). 
10
 Skewes was brought under chapter 15 of Title 27 of the Compiled Laws of Utah i 
(governing "Prevention and Punishment of Corrupt Practices in Elections") rather than 
chapter 16 (governing "Elections Contests"). See Skewes, 196 P. at 850. However, the 
Skewes court's holding is still important in this case because, similar to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20A-4-403(5)(c), chapter 15 also provided a specific time period in which a party was 
required to answer—under that statute, 10 days. See Compiled Laws of the State of Utah, ' 
§2398(1917). 
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B. The Court Did Not Err in Rescheduling the Date of the Original 
Hearing, and Maxfield Has Failed to Demonstrate Any Prejudice 
Resulting from the Change. 
In Utah, district courts enjoy "broad discretion in managing the cases assigned to 
their courts." Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 16). This discretion extends to the management and 
administration of the court's docket, including motion practice and trial scheduling. See 
State v. Bergeson, 2010 UT App 281, f^ 7, 241 P.3d 777. Nevertheless, even where a 
court abuses this discretion or otherwise errs as a matter law, its decision will not be 
reversed absent a showing of prejudice by the objecting party. See, e.g., King v. Fereday, 
739 P.2d 618, 622 (Utah 1987) (stating that a court "may reverse a trial court judgment 
only if there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a 
result more favorable to the complaining party" (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted)). 
There was no error in this case. Upon receiving the election contest petition, the 
District Court scheduled a hearing for January 19, 2011. This date fell within the 20-day 
window § 20A-4-404(l)(b) provides. After the hearing was scheduled, Herbert and 
Corroon filed motions to dismiss. Maxfield then filed a "Request [sic] Enlargement Of 
Time For Hearing," requesting that the court schedule a full day for the hearing. {See R. 
89.) Accordingly, the District Court rescheduled the hearing to January 25, 2011. 
Rescheduling the hearing was within the sound discretion of the District Court based 
upon the realities of the proceeding and Maxfield's own request for a longer hearing. As 
the District Court explained in denying Maxfield's Motion for a New Hearing, 
-15-
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[t]he court scheduled a hearing date within the 20 day period required by 
statute, and allowed two hours for the hearing. The court would have 
proceeded as scheduled, but for the Respondents filing motions to dismiss 
and Petitioner's request for a full day in which to present his evidence. 
(R. 245.) 
Even if the District Court did err in changing the date of the hearing—and it did 
not—Maxfieid is not entitled to a reversal because he has not demonstrated any prejudice 
resulting from the court's decision to change the hearing date. In his brief, Maxfieid tries i 
to avoid this fact by alleging that he was "unfairly prejudiced . . . as he was unable to 
present any facts to support any one of the causes for an election contest." (Appellant's 
i 
Br. at 53.) Significantly, however, this alleged prejudice is a direct result of the District 
Court's decision to grant Herbert's 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, not from its decision to 
change the hearing date. Indeed, Maxfieid's own response upon being notified of the ( 
date change was "great, we've got more time." (R. 253 at p. 7.) The District Court did 
not err in changing the date of the hearing. Even if it did, Maxfieid was not prejudiced by 
the change. Reversal is not justified. 
II. THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED HERBERT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS-
 ( 
Maxfieid contends that the District Court erred by granting Herbert's motion to 
dismiss. Maxfieid's contention is unfounded. "Whether a court properly granted a 
i 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a question of law, which [is] review[ed] for correctness." 
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation Co., 2011 UT 33, f 19, 258 P.3d 539. In 
reviewing the dismissal, courts "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and i 
interpret those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the 
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plaintiff as the non-moving party." Oakwood VilL, LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 
101, f 9, 104 P.3d 1226. A court "may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is 
sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even if it differs from 
that stated by the trial court." Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C., 2010 UT 29, 
*! 10, 232 P.3d 999 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
This appeal focuses on the District Court's straightforward legal determination 
based upon the plain language of the relevant statutes. Accordingly, this Court can affirm 
the District Court's decision on several grounds. First, suits by a registered voter based 
on alleged violations of the Election Code must be brought pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 20A-1-703. Second, eligibility for the office of governor is determined by the Utah 
Constitution. Third, even assuming that a violation of the Election Code affects a 
gubernatorial candidate's eligibility for office under § 20A-4-402, Maxfield's suit is 
premature as there has been no determination under § 20A-1-703 that Herbert has 
violated the Election Code. 
A. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-4-402 Does Not Provide Voters with a Private 
Right of Action Against Candidates for Alleged Election Code 
Violations. 
Maxfield filed the Petition with the District Court pursuant to §§ 20A-4-402 and 
20A-4-403 of the Election Code. {See R.l.) However, as with each of his previous 
actions, the underlying allegations in this action are assertions that Herbert violated 
campaign and financial reporting requirements contained in the Election Code. (See R. 3, 
8-10.) The Lieutenant Governor is the officer primarily charged with enforcing the 
applicable provisions for gubernatorial candidates. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-11-
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206, -403, -1001 to -1004. To assist the Lieutenant Governor, Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-
703 provides that a "registered voter who has information that any provisions of this title 
have been violated by any candidate . . . may file a verified petition with the lieutenant 
governor." If such a petition is filed, the Lieutenant Governor gathers information 
relating to the petition and determines if a special investigation is necessary. Utah Code 
Ann. §20A-l-703(2). 
If the Lieutenant Governor determines that a special investigation is necessary, he 
forwards the information to the Attorney General. Id. The Attorney General then 
determines if probable cause exists such that special counsel should be appointed and a 
proceeding commenced. Id. § 20A-l-703(3). If the Attorney General does determine 
that probable cause exists, then a registered voter may be allowed to bring a special 
proceeding in the name of the state to investigate the alleged violations. Id. § 20A-1-
703(4)(a). There are no other means by which a registered voter may commence a 
proceeding based upon alleged violations of the Election Code.11 
11
 Maxfield attempts to rely upon section 20A-1-703(5), which states that 
"[n]othing in this section may be construed to prohibit any other civil or criminal actions < 
or remedies against alleged violators," for the proposition that section 20A-1-703 is not 
his only remedy. (Appellant's Br. at 48.) However, "a right of action on a particular 
state of facts does not exist unless the authority for bringing it is found either in common 
or statutory law." 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 36 (2005); see also Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 
12, fflf 20-21, 66 P.3d 592 (stating that "[i]n the absence of language expressly granting a i 
private right of action in the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a 
private right of action" and that a right of action requires more "than a mere allusion to 
'civil actions' as evidence of a legislative intent to impart substantive rights"). Utah's 
election code only authorizes a suit by a private party in section 20A-1-703, and then 
only after receiving leave from the Attorney General and in the name of the state. See 
§ 20A-l-703(4)(a). Thus, any other potential claims that Maxfield could have brought 
(continued . . .) 
1 O 
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The proper way for Maxfield to raise any alleged violations of the Election Code 
is through the process set forth in § 20A-1-703. That process begins with a petition filed 
with the Lieutenant Governor, which Maxfield has already filed. Each action Maxfield 
has filed, including this one, is merely an attempt to circumvent the statutory process set 
forth in § 20A-1-703. Fortunately, the courts have properly recognized that any action 
based upon these allegations may only be brought through the the Lieutenant Governor 
and the Attorney General and only in compliance with the provisions of § 20A-1-703. 
This Court should reach a similar conclusion. 
As Herbert argued before the District Court, 
[to] permit the sort of suit which Maxfield is attempting to bring under 
§ 20A-4-403 would allow aspiring candidates to circumvent the process the 
Utah legislature has established and become a self-appointed de facto 
lieutenant governor / attorney general charged with enforcing the election 
code. If the law were as Maxfield imagines, any Utah registered voter 
could haul elected officials to court in every county throughout Utah by 
merely alleging inadequacies in an official's campaign disclosures. Utah 
Code Ann. § 20A-1-703 prevents such chaos, while still allowing registered 
voters to raise their concerns for investigation by the lieutenant governor's 
office and the attorney general. 
(R. 173-74.) Thus, this action should be recognized for what it is: an attempt to assert a 
private right of action where none exists. The District Court's dismissal should be 
affirmed. 
(. . . continued) 
would have to have been based on something other than alleged violations of the election 
code and brought under the common law or some other chapter of the Utah Code. 
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B. Eligibility Is Defined by the Utah Constitution. 
In addition to the grounds stated above, Maxfield's petition was properly 
dismissed because eligibility of a gubernatorial candidate is defined by the Utah 
Constitution. Maxfield claims that Herbert was not "eligible" for the office of governor. 
Maxfield's claim is based on the mistaken premise that eligibility for office is determined 
by whether a gubernatorial candidate properly filed all campaign reports required under 
the Election Code. Maxfield is wrong. 
Eligibility for the office of governor is defined by the Utah Constitution. Article 
VII, Section 3 of the Utah Constitution sets forth the "Qualifications of officers" for the 
Executive Department, and provides that to be "eligible for the office of Governor" an 
individual must be (1) "30 years of age or older at the time of the election"; (2) "a 
qualified voter"; and (3) "a resident citizen of the state for five years next preceding the 
election." Utah Const. Art. VII, § 3(1), (4). It is undisputed that Herbert meets all of 
these requirements and is thus eligible for the office. 
In his brief, Maxfield cites two unpublished district court memoranda decisions 
in support for his argument that a candidate may bring suit against another candidate for 
lack of eligibility based upon a failure to comply with statutory requirements. See 
Torgerson v. Albrecht, No. 020600034 MI (Utah 6th D. Ct. Jan. 23, 2003); Maxfield v. 
Wimmer, No. 110900149 (Utah 3d D. Ct. June 29, 2011). Both cases are easily 
distinguishable from the case at hand. The distinguishing feature of Torgerson is that the 
office at issue was that of a county sheriff—an office for which there is no constitutional 
definition of eligibility. Thus, the court was left to determine eligibility from the only 
available source: the statutory qualifications laid out in the Utah Code. See § 17-22-1.5 
In Wirnmer, Maxfield brought an election controversy proceeding against a recently 
elected and seated state legislator. However, the court dismissed that action on the 
express grounds that it does not have authority to sustain an election controversy action 
(continued . . .) 
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Maxfield's argument attempts to equate a gubernatorial candidate's potential 
disqualification for violations of the Election Code with that candidate's constitutionally 
defined eligibility. See, e.g., § 20A-11-206(1) (stating that state office candidates who 
fail to file certain statements may be disqualified). Maxfield's position is overreaching. 
Disqualification of a gubernatorial candidate based upon violations of the Election Code 
is not the same as a lack of eligibility. The Utah Constitution defines the three 
requirements a gubernatorial candidate must meet to be "eligible." An action brought 
1 O 
pursuant to § 20A-4-402 only relates to these requirements. It is undisputed that 
Herbert meets the constitutional requirements for eligibility. The dismissal of this action 
should be affirmed. 
C. Even Assuming That a Gubernatorial Candidate's Eligibility Were Not 
Limited to the Constitutional Definition, Maxfield's Suit Would Be 
Premature. 
Finally, even accepting Maxfield's argument that a gubernatorial candidate can be 
deemed ineligible based on a violation of the Election Code, the current action would 
first require some court to have found that Herbert violated the Election Code. As the 
District Court recognized, "the main crux of the issue for me to consider is whether or not 
this is the proper Court and proper forum to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding 
(. . . continued) 
against a member of the state house of representatives once he or she is seated. Any 
other statements in that opinion are pure dicta. 
According to Maxfield, Herbert has argued that campaign finance reporting 
requirements are somehow unconstitutional. Herbert makes no such argument. Gary 
Herbert's argument, as it concerns the Utah Constitution, is simply that "eligibility," as it 
pertains to an action brought under § 20A-4-402 and involving a constitutionally created 
office, is defined in the Utah Constitution. 
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disqualifications of the Governor[.]" (R. 253 at p. 41.) As already explained in this brief, 
it is not. 
There is no dispute that Herbert meets the constitutional eligibility requirements 
for the office of governor. (See R. 253 at p. 39.) There is no dispute that Herbert has no , 
criminal convictions that would disqualify him from candidacy. (R. 253 at pp. 39-40.) 
There is no dispute that there has been no determination made by a court or other body 
< 
that Herbert has violated the Election Code. (R. 253 at p. 40.) Accordingly, even under 
Maxfield's theory of eligibility, "[tjhere is no evidence that [Herbert] was not eligible for 
the office at the time of the election." (R. 182.) Maxfield has already filed the Lt. Gov. ( 
Petition in accordance with § 20A-1-703, the only action that he is entitled to take based 
on the underlying allegations of his complaint. Absent a determination under that process 
that Herbert violated the alleged provision of the Election Code, this current action is 
premature. 
III. THE COURT'S DISMISSAL OF MAXFIELD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT i 
BASED UPON A LACK OF FORM. 
As a last-ditch effort to continue his legal assault against Herbert, Maxfield argues 
that the District Court was prohibited from dismissing his complaint for "lack of form." 
See § Utah Code Ann. 20A-4-403(4). According to Maxfield, his allegations that Herbert 
violated campaign finance reporting requirements were more than sufficient to advise < 
Herbert "of the particular proceeding or cause for which the election is contested." Id. 
As with Maxfield's other arguments, this contention also fails. While it is true that 
the weight of authority holds that statutes governing contested elections 
should be liberally construed[,] . . . this rule of liberal construction may 
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[not] be extended so as to overturn the well-established rule of practice that 
the evidence must be confined to the issues raised by the pleadings, and that 
the judgment rendered must conform thereto. 
Earner v. Howell, 86 P. 1073, 1076 (Utah 1906). Thus, in the context of an election 
contest, a party "must recover upon the allegations of the pleadings . . . or not at all." Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
Maxfield's petition was not dismissed because he committed some procedural 
error that the court could have overlooked. Rather, after considering all of the underlying 
allegations in Maxfield's petition, the District Court concluded that Maxfield failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under any of the provisions of § 20A-4-
402. Thus, dismissal was warranted. The District Court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the District Court's Order 
dismissing Maxfield's complaint against Herbert for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted. 
DATED: November 30, 2011. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
Timothy K. Conde 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Gary Herbert 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-4-401 to -406 
Exhibit B: former Utah Code Ann. § 20A-1-703 (2010) 
Exhibit C: former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (2011) 
Exhibit D: Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7 
Exhibit E: Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 
Exhibit F: Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 81 
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ELECTION RETURNS AND ELECTION CONTESTS 20A-4-401 
(ii) publish and file the results of the canvass in the lieutenant 
governor's office. 
(b) The lieutenant governor shall certify the results of the Western 
States Presidential Primary canvass to each registered political party that 
participated in the primary not later than the April 15 after the primary 
election. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-306, enacted by L. The 2007 amendment, effective April 30, 
1993, ch. 1, § 114; 1995, ch. 340, § 12; 1997, 2007, added Subsection (l)(c). 
ch. 183, § 9; 1999, ch. 22, § 13; 2002 (5th The 2008 amendment, effective May 5, 2008, 
S.S.), ch. 11, § 3; 200(5, ch. 355, § 4; 2007, ch. deleted "or the following business day if April 
75, § 18; 2008, ch. 225, § 6; 2009, ch. 202, § 2. 15 falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday* at 
Amendment Notes. — The 2006 amend- the end of (6)(b). 
ment, effective May 1, 2006, substituted kTues- The 2009 amendment, effective May 12, 
day that falls two weeks after" for "third Thurs- 2009, substituted "day that falls seven days 
day after" in Subsection (6)(a) and added "or after the last day on which a county canvass 
the following business day if April 15 foils on a may occur under Section 20A-4-301 for" for 
Saturday, Sunday, or a holiday" in Subsection "Tuesday that falls two weeks after" in the 
C6)(b). introductory language of (6)(a). 
PART 4 
RECOUNTS AND ELECTION CONTESTS 
20A-4-401. Recounts — Procedure. 
(1) (a) (i) For any regular primary, regular general, or municipal general 
election, or the Western States Presidential primary, when any 
candidate loses by not more than a total of one vote per voting 
precinct, the candidate may file a request for a recount within seven 
days after the canvass with: 
(A) the municipal clerk, if the election is a municipal election; 
(B) the local district clerk, if the election is a local district 
election; 
(C) the county clerk, for races or ballot propositions voted on 
entirely within a single county; or 
(D) the lieutenant governor, for statewide races and ballot 
propositions and for multicounty races and ballot propositions. 
(ii) For any municipal primary election, when any candidate loses 
by not more than a total of one vote per voting precinct, the candidate 
may file a request for a recount with the appropriate election officer 
within three days after the canvass, 
(b) The election officer shall: 
(i) supervise the recount; -
(ii) recount all ballots cast for tha t office; 
(iii) reexamine all unopened absentee ballots to ensure compliance 
with Chapter 3, Part 3, Absentee Voting; and 
(iv) declare elected the person receiving the highest number of 
votes on the recount. 
(2) (a) Any 10 voters who voted in an election when any ballot proposition 
or bond proposition was on the ballot may file a request for a recount with 
the appropriate election officer within seven days of the canvass. 
(b) The election officer shall: 
(i) supervise the recount; 
461 
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20A-4-402 ELECTION CODE 
(ii) recount all ballots cast for that ballot proposition or bond 
proposition; 
(iii) reexamine all unopened absentee ballots to ensure compliance 
with Chapter 3, Par t 3, Absentee Voting; and 
(iv) declare the ballot proposition or bond proposition to have 
"passed" or "failed" based upon the results of the recount. 
(c) Proponents and opponents of the ballot proposition or bond propo-
sition may designate representatives to witness the recount. 
(d) The voters requesting the recount shall pay the costs of the recount. 
(3) Costs incurred by recount under Subsection (1) may not be assessed 
against the person requesting the recount. 
(4) (a) Upon completion of the recount, the election officer shall immedi-
ately convene the board of canvassers. 
(b) The board of canvassers shall: 
(i) canvass the election returns for the race or proposition that was 
the subject of the recount; and 
(ii) with the assistance of the election officer, prepare and sign the 
report required by Section 20A-4-304 or Section 20A-4-306. 
(c) If the recount is for a statewide or multicounty race or for a 
statewide proposition, the board of county canvassers shall prepare and 
transmit a separate report to the lieutenant governor as required by 
Subsection 20A-4-304(3). 
(d) The canvassers' report prepared as provided in this Subsection (4) is 
the official result of the race or proposition that is the subject of the 
recount. 
History: C. 1953,20A-4-401, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 2007 amend-
1993, ch. 1, § 115; 1999, ch. 22, § 14; 1999, ment, effective April 30, 2007, twice substituted 
-. h. 45, § 6; 2000, ch. 3, § 4; 2001, ch. 20, § 4; "local district" for "special district" in Subsec-
2002, ch. 133, § 3; 2005, ch. 105, § 81; 2007, tion (l)(a)(i)(B). 
ch. 329, § 382. 
20A-4-402. Election contests — Grounds, 
(1) The election or nomination of any person to any public office, and the 
declared result of the vote on any ballot proposition or bond proposition 
submitted to a vote of the people may be contested according to the procedures 
established in this part only: 
(a) for malconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of the judges of 
election at any polling place, or of any board of canvassers, or any judge or 
member of the board sufficient to change the result; 
(b) when the person declared elected was not eligible for the office at the 
time of the election; 
(c) when the person declared elected has: 
(i) given or offered to any registered voter, judge, or canvasser of 
the election any bribe or reward in money, property, or anything of 
value for the purpose of influencing the election; or 
(ii) committed any other offense against the elective franchise; 
(d) when illegal votes have been received or legal votes have been 
rejected at the polls sufficient to change the result; 
(e) for any error of any board of canvassers or judges of election in 
counting the votes or declaring the result of the election, if the error would 
change the result; 
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(f) when the election result would change because a sufficient number 
of ballots containing uncorrected errors or omissions have been received at 
the polls; 
(g) when the candidate declared elected is ineligible to serve in the office 
to which the candidate was elected; 
(h) when an election judge or clerk was a party to malconduct, fraud, or 
corruption sufficient to change the result of the election; and 
(i) for any other cause that shows that another person was legally 
elected. 
(2) Any irregularity or improper conduct by the election judges does not void 
an election unless the irregularity or improper conduct would result in the 
election of a person who did not receive the highest number of legal votes. 
(3) When any election held for any office is contested because of any 
irregularity or improper conduct on the part of a judge of any voting precinct, 
a court, upon proof of the irregularity or improper conduct may not set aside 
the election unless the irregularity or improper conduct would change the 
result for that office. 
History: C. 1953,20A-4-402, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 116; 2005, ch. 105, § 82. 
Cross-References. — Each house of legisla-
ture is judge of election and qualifications of its 
members, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Annulment of election. 
Evidence. 
In general. 
Local option election. 
Marking of ballots. 




Rejection of ballots. 
Rejection of votes. 
Remedies of successful candidate. 
Annulment of election. 
Election cannot stand if held or conducted in 
violation of some express constitutional or stat-
utory provision, or if result was affected by 
commission or omission prohibited by law on 
the part of the voters or if fraud, intimidation, 
or other illegal methods were practiced. Hardy 
v. Beaver City, 41 Utah 80, 125 P. 679 (1912). 
Evidence. 
In proceeding to contest election, evidence 
held to sustain finding by trial court that de-
fendant had not promised to appoint certain 
person to offices if elected. Hamer v. Howell, 31 
Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906), 
Equity courts have no inherent power to 
inquire into political or quasi-political matters, 
such as election contest, unless authorized to do 
so by statute, and then only to extent and in 
manner provided in statute. Ewing v. Harries, 
68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 (1926). 
In general. 
Generally, election may be contested only 
upon grounds enumerated in statute. Payne v. 
Hodgson, 34 Utah 296, 97 P. 132 (1908). 
Local option election. 
An election in a city to determine whether 
sale of intoxicating liquors shall be authorized 
or denied therein is an election within purview 
of this provision because that is a "proposition 
submitted to a vote of the people." Hardy v. 
Beaver City, 41 Utah 80, 125 P. 679 (1912). 
Marking of ballots. 
Complaint predicated upon ground that cer-
tain ballots were counted for contestee which, 
because of their markings, should not have 
been counted for any candidate under former 
§ 20-7-21 was basis for successful election con-
test over office of city councilman to which three 
candidates were to be elected. Johnstun v. Har-
rison, 114 Utah 94, 197 P2d 470 (1948). 
Mistakes by voters. 
Where two ballot boxes were placed side by 
side, one for city and one for county tickets, and 
by mistake several county tickets were placed 
in the city ballot box, it was held that in spite of 
an agreement entered into before the election 
by all the judges of election and by all the 
parties that in case of mistake in putting a 
ballot in the wrong box it should not be counted, 
they should nevertheless be counted, where it 
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was not done through the fraud of the voters. 
Young v. Deming, 9 Utah 204, 33 P. 818 (1893). 
Parties. 
Under the former local option laws, if a city 
refused to defend a contest, an elector and 
resident might do so. Beauregaard v. Gunnison 
City, 48 Utah 515, 160 P. 815 (1916). 
Pleadings. 
The same general rule of civil pleading that 
requires plaintiff to set forth in his complaint 
the facts upon which he bases his right for relief 
governs in election contests. It is not sufficient 
to allege mere conclusions of law. Hamer v. 
Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906). 
In action to contest election, complaint that 
was entirely barren of any fact or statement 
that in any way tended to advise defendant 
that contestant intended to question validity of 
ballots objected to on any one or more of partic-
ular grounds upon which challenges were 
based held insufficient. Hamer v. Howell, 31 
Utah 144, 86 P. 1073 (1906). 
While complaint in election contest failed to 
allege sufficient facts to show cause of action as 
to two grounds predicated upon failure to count 
certain ballots for contestant, complaint was 
sufficient as to third ground predicated upon 
counting of certain ballots for contestee which, 
because of their markings, should not have 
been counted for any candidate under former 
§ 20-7-21, so that overruling of general demur-
rer was proper. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 
94, 197 P2d 470 (1948). 
Procedure. 
While statutes governing contested elections 
should be liberally construed in order that 
justice may be done, this rule of liberal con-
struction may not be extended so as to overturn 
well-established rule of practice that evidence 
must be confined to issues raised by pleadings, 
and that judgment rendered must conform 
hereto. Hamer v. Howell, 31 Utah 144, 86 P. 
1073 (1906). 
In election contest, contestant cannot ques-
tion regularity or validity of proceedings of 
conventions or committees in making or filing 
nominations of candidates, nor can he in such 
proceeding review the action of officer whose 
duty it is to make up party tickets and from 
them prepare the official ballot. Payne v. 
Hodgson, 34 Utah 269, 97 P. 132 (1908). 
Rejection of ballots. 
Under former law the rejection of ballots cast 
by voters because their names did not appear 
on the registration list was not sufficient to 
annul an election, even though if these votes 
had been received and counted for contestant, 
the result of the election would have been 
different. Ferguson v. Allen, 7 Utah 263, 26 P. 
570 (1891). 
Rejection of votes. 
An election cannot be annulled for alleged 
improper rejection of votes if it does not appear 
that such votes, if cast, would change the re-
sult. Ferguson v. Allen, 7 Utah 263, 26 P. 570 
(1891). 
Where ballots which ought to have been 
counted in the result have been rejected in such 
numbers that if cast for the contestant they 
would have changed the result, yet where the 
evidence is uncertain as to which candidate 
received the ballots, the return of the judges of 
election will not be disturbed. Young v. Deming, 
9 Utah 204, 33 P. 818 (1893). 
Remedies of successful candidate. 
Plaintiff who received highest number of 
votes in election was entitled to mandamus 
compelling clerk to issue to him certificate of 
election under former § 20-8-7, remedy under 
former chapter being inadequate since relief 
requested was issuance of certificate of election 
and not declaration of right to office. Hill v. 
Moss, 61 Utah 213, 211 P. 994 (1922); Howe v. 
Moss, 61 Utah 222, 211 P. 998 (1922); Palmer v. 
Board of County Canvassers, 111 Utah 144, 176 
P2d 608 (1947). 
20A-4-403. Election contest — Pet i t ion and response. 
(1) (a) In contesting the results of all elections, except for primary elections 
and bond elections, a registered voter shall contest the right of any person 
declared elected to any office by filing a verified written complaint with the 
district court of the county in which he resides within 40 days after the 
canvass, 
(b) The complaint shall include: 
(i) the name of the party contesting the election; 
(ii) a statement that the party is a registered voter in the jurisdic-
tion in which the election was held; 
(hi) the name of the person whose right to the office is contested; 
(iv) the office to which that person was ostensibly elected; 
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(v) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in 
Section 20A-4-402; 
(vi) the person who was purportedly elected to the office as respon-
dent; and 
(vii) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all 
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was 
rejected. 
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that: 
(i) illegal votes were given in one or more specified voting precincts 
to a person whose election is contested, which, if taken from him, 
would reduce the number of his legal votes below the number of legal 
votes given to some other person for the same office; or 
(ii) that legal votes for another person were rejected, which, if 
counted, would raise the number of legal votes for that person above 
the number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is 
contested. 
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any of the votes 
described in Subsection (l)(c) unless the party contesting the election 
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a 
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the 
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at 
trial. 
(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested 
votes except those that are specified in that list. 
(2) (a) In contesting the results of a primary election, when contesting the 
petition nominating an independent candidate, or when challenging any 
person, election officer, election official, board, or convention for failing to 
nominate a person, a registered voter shall contest the right of any person 
declared nominated to any office by filing a verified written complaint 
within 10 days after the date of the canvass for the primary election, after 
the date of filing of the petition, or after the date of the convention, 
respectively, with: 
(i) the district court of the county in which he resides if he is 
contesting a nomination made only by voters from that county; or 
(ii) the Utah Supreme Court, if he is contesting a nomination made 
by voters in more than one county, 
(b) The complaint shall include: 
(i) the name of the party contesting the nomination; 
(ii) a statement that the contesting party is a registered voter in 
the jurisdiction in which the election was held; 
(iii) the name of the person whose right to nomination is contested 
or the name of the person who failed to have their name placed in 
nomination; 
(iv) the office to which that person was nominated or should have 
been nominated; 
(v) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in 
Subsection (1); 
(vi) the person who was purportedly nominated to the office as 
respondent; and 
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(vii) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all 
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was 
rejected. 
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that: 
(i) illegal votes were given to a person whose election is contested, 
which, if taken from him, would reduce the number of his legal votes 
below the number of legal votes given to some other person for the 
same office; or 
(ii) legal votes for another person were rejected, which, if counted, 
would raise the number of legal votes for that person above the 
number of legal votes cast for the person whose election is contested. 
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any the votes 
described in Subsection (2)(c), unless the party contesting the election 
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a 
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the 
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at 
trial. 
(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested 
votes except those that are specified in that list. 
(3) (a) In contesting the results of a bond election, a registered voter shall 
contest the validity of the declared results by filing a verified written 
complaint with the district court of the county in which he resides within 
40 days after the date of the official finding entered under Section 
11-14-207. 
(b) The complaint shall include: 
(i) the name of the party contesting the election; 
(ii) a statement that the party is a registered voter in the jurisdic-
tion in which the election was held; 
(iii) the bond proposition that is the subject of the contest; 
(iv) one or more of the grounds for an election contest specified in 
Section 20A-4-402; and 
(v) if the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a ground for the contest, the name and address of all 
persons who allegedly cast illegal votes or whose legal vote was 
rejected. 
(c) When the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a cause of contest, it is sufficient to state generally that: 
(i) illegal votes were counted in one or more specified voting 
precincts which, if taken out of the count, would change the declared 
result of the vote on the proposition; or 
(ii) legal votes were rejected in one or more specified voting 
precincts, which, if counted, would change the declared result of the 
vote on the proposition. 
(d) (i) The court may not take or receive evidence of any of the votes 
described in Subsection (3)(c) unless the party contesting the election 
delivers to the opposite party, at least three days before the trial, a 
written list of the number of contested votes and by whom the 
contested votes were given or offered, which he intends to prove at 
trial. 
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(ii) The court may not take or receive any evidence of contested 
votes except those that are specified in that list. 
(4) The court may not reject any statement of the grounds of contest or 
dismiss the proceedings because of lack of form, if the grounds of the contest 
are alleged with such certainty as will advise the defendant gf the particular 
proceeding or cause for whiqh the election is contested. 
(5) (a) The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the respondent. 
(b) (i) If the petitioner cannot obtain personal service of the petition on 
the respondent, the petitioner may serve the respondent by leaving a 
copy of the petition with the clerk of the court with which the petition 
was filed. 
(ii) The clerk shall make diligent inquiry and attempt to inform the 
respondent that he has five days to answer the complaint. 
(c) The respondent shall answer the petition within five days after the 
service. 
(d) If the reception of illegal votes or the rejection of legal votes is 
alleged as a ground for the contest, the defendant shall set forth in the 
answer the name and address of all persons whom the defendant believes 
were properly or improperly admitted or denied the vote. 
(e) If the answer contains a counterclaim, the petitioner shall file a 
reply within 10 days after service of the counterclaim. 
(6) (a) The provisions of this Subsection (6) provide additional require-
ments that apply to municipal election contests that are in addition to the 
other requirements of this section governing election contest. 
(b) Municipal election contests shall be filed, tried, and determined in 
the district court of the county in which the municipality is located. 
(c) (i) As a condition precedent to filing a municipal election contest, 
the petitioner shall file a written affidavit of intention to contest the 
election with the clerk of the court within seven days after the votes 
are canvassed. 
(ii) The affidavit shall include: 
(A) the petitioner's name; 
(B) the fact that the petitioner is a qualified voter of the 
municipality; 
(C) the respondent's name; 
(D) the elective office contested; 
(E) the time of election; and 
(F) the grounds for the contest. 
(d) (i) Before the-district court takes jurisdiction of a municipal election 
contest, the petitioner shall file a bond with the clerk of the court with 
the sureties required by the court. 
(ii) The bond shall name the respondent as obligee and be condi-
tioned for the payment of all costs incurred by the respondent if the 
respondent prevails. 
History: C. 1953,20A-4-403, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 117; 2005, ch. 105, § 83; 2007, 
ch. 238, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2007 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2007, substituted the 
language beginning "after the date of the can-
vass" for "from the date of the primary election, 
filing of the petition, or date of the convention 
with" at the end of introductory language in 
Subsection (2)(a). 
467 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 0 A - 4 - 4 0 4 ELECTION CODE 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Amendments. 
ANALYSIS Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. 1049 
(1926). 
0 __ . While complaint in election contest failed to 
Sufficiency of complaint.
 a l l e g e s u f f i c i e n t f a c t s t o s h o w c a u s e o f a c t i o n a s 
me or n s . to two grounds predicated upon failure to count 
Amendments. certain ballots for contestant, complaint was 
If valid contest is filed within statutory lim- sufficient as to third ground predicated upon 
itation period, amendment respecting nonjuris- counting of certain ballots for contestee which, 
dictional matters may be made after limitation because of their markings, should not have 
period. Ewing v. Harries, 68 Utah 452, 250 P. been counted for any candidate under former 
1049 (1926). § 20-7-21, so that overruling of general demur-
rer was proper. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 
Sufficiency of complaint.
 9 4 j 1 9 7 p2d 470 (1948). 
Election contest under former § 20-15-5 
predicated on alleged compulsion by church Time for contest. 
respecting voting of its members, on ground Election contest was untimely when brought 
that such conduct was illegal, particularly in more than 40 days after the report to the board 
view of Utah Const, Art. I, Sec. 4, forbidding of canvassers of the number of votes cast. Spear 
union of church and state, was maintainable. v. Marshall, 95 Utah 62, 79 P.2d 15 (1938). 
2QA-4-404. Election contest — Calendaring and disposi-
tion. 
(1) (a) Upon receipt of the petition, the clerk shall inform the chief judge of 
the court having jurisdiction. 
(b) The chief judge shall issue an order: 
(i) assigning the case to a district court judge, if the district court 
has jurisdiction; and 
(ii) setting a date and time, not less than 10 nor more than 30 days 
from the date the petition was filed to hear and determine the contest. 
(c) The clerk shall: 
(i) issue a subpoena for the person whose right to the office is 
contested to appear at the time and place specified in the order; and 
(ii) cause the subpoena to be served. 
(2) The court shall meet at the time and place designated to determine the 
contest. 
(3) (a) If it is necessary for the court to inspect the ballots of any voting 
precinct in order to determine any election contest the judge may order the 
proper officer to produce them. 
(b) The judge shall: 
(i) open and inspect the ballots in open court in the presence of the 
parties or their attorneys; and 
(ii) immediately after the inspection, seal them in an envelope and 
return them, by mail or otherwise, to their legal custodian. 
(4) (a) If the petition, response, or counterclaim alleges an error in the 
canvass sufficient to change the result, the court may order and conduct a 
recount of the ballots or vote tabulation. 
(b) The court may also require the production of any documents, 
records, and other evidence necessary to enable it to determine the legality 
or illegality of any vote cast or counted. 
(c) (i) After all the evidence in the contest is submitted, the court shall 
enter its judgment, either confirming the election result or annulling 
and setting aside the election. 
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(ii) If the court determines that a person other than the one 
declared elected received the highest number of legal votes, the court 
shall declare that person elected. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-404, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 118. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS have been counted for any candidate under 
former § 20-7-21 and official election watchers 
Ballots as evidence. [n voting districts testified that several of such 
Grounds for opening ballot pouches. ballots were so counted, number of which was 
Verdict and findings. sufficient to change result of election, court was 
_ „ , . , justified in ordering ballot pouches opened. 
Ballots as evidence Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 94, 197 R2d 
The burden of proof in all election contests is 470 (1948) 
upon the contestant who offers and relies upon 
ballots to show that they have been kept and Verdict and findings. 
preserved according to statutory requirements; In contest of election, wherein it was charged 
before ballots can be received in evidence it that defendant, a candidate, made $10 contri-
must affirmatively appear from the testimony bution to one of judges of voting district for 
that they have been so preserved. Farrell v. political purposes, mere fact that defendant, 
Larsen, 26 Utah 283, 73 P. 227 (1903). under direction of county chairman, handed his 
campaign contribution to party to be taken to 
Grounds for opening ballot pouches. precinct judge of election whom he erroneously 
Where complaint, in election contest over believed to be precinct chairman would not 
office of city councilman to which three candi- sustain finding that defendant contributed 
dates were to be elected, sufficiently alleged money for political purposes in manner not 
cause of action on ground that certain ballots sanctioned by law. Skewes v. Bliss, 58 Utah 51, 
were counted for contestee which should not 196 P. 850 (1921). 
20A-4-405. Election contests — Costs. 
(1) The court shall enter judgment for costs against the party contesting the 
election if: 
(a) the proceedings are dismissed for: 
(i) insufficiency of pleading or proof; or 
(ii) want of prosecution; or 
(b) the election is confirmed by the court. 
(2) The court shall enter judgment for costs against the party whose election 
was contested if the election is annulled and set aside. 
(3) (a) Each party is liable for the costs of the officers and witnesses that 
appeared on his behalf. 
(b) The party may pay, and the officers and witnesses may collect, those 
costs in the same manner as similar costs are paid and collected in other 
cases. 
History: C. 1953, 20A-4-405, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 119. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Allowance of costs. testant his costs in election contest. Johnstun v. 
Trial court properly allowed prevailing con- Harrison, 114 Utah 94, 197 P.2d 470 (1948). 
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20A-4-406. Election contests — Appeal. 
(1) (a) Either party may appeal the district court's judgment to the Su-
preme Court as in other cases of appeal from the district court. 
(b) When an appeal is taken, the district court may not stay execution 
or proceedings, except execution for costs. 
(2) Whenever an election is annulled or set aside by the judgment of a court 
and no appeal is taken within 10 days, the certificate of election, if any has 
been issued, is void, and the office is vacant. 
History: C. 1953,20A-4-406, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 120. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Scope of review. had not been detached therefrom, because 
It was not necessary for Supreme Court on countingof that ballot would not be sufficient to 
appeal in election contest to determine whether change result. Johnstun v. Harrison, 114 Utah 
trial court erred in rejecting ballot because stub 94, 197 R2d 470 (1948). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 26 Am. Jur. 2d Elections C.J.S. — 29 C.J.S. Elections § 401 et seq. 
§ 381 et seq. 
PART 5 
OFFENSES INVOLVING ELECTION RETURNS 
20A-4-501. Election returns — Forgery. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to: 
(a) forge or counterfeit any election returns from any election purport-
ing to have been held at any voting precinct where no election was in fact < 
held; 
(b) willfully substitute any forged or counterfeit election returns in the 
place of the true return for a voting precinct where any election was 
actually held; or 
(c) commit or cause any fraud in any election in any manner. 
(2) Each person who violates this section may be sentenced to imprisonment { 
in the state prison for a term of not less than two nor more than 10 years. 
History: C. 1953,20A-4-501, enacted by L. 
1993, ch. 1, § 121. 
20A-4-502. Altering vote count or returns. < 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to: 
(a) willfully add to or subtract from the votes actually cast at an election 
in any election returns; or 
(b) alter any election returns. 
(2) Any person who violates this section may be sentenced to imprisonment ( 
in the state prison for not less than one nor more than five years. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 20A-1-703 
20A-I'70!8 rr iM'rrdinuis i>y r e g i s t e r e d vo te r , 
(1) Any registered voter who has information that any provisions of this title 
have been violated by any candidate for whom the registered voter had the 
right to vote, by any personal campaign committee of that candidate, by any 
member of that committee, or by any election official, may file a verified 
petition with the lieutenant governor. 
(2) (a) The lieutenant governor shall gather information and determine if a 
special investigation is necessary. 
(b) If the lieutenant governor determines that a special investigation is 
necessary, the lieutenant governor shall refer the information to the 
attorney general, who shall: 
(i) bring a special proceeding to investigate and determine whether 
or not there has been a violation; and 
(ii) appoint special counsel to conduct that proceeding on behalf of 
the state. 
(3) If it appears from the petition or otherwise that sufficient evidence is 
obtainable to show that there is probable cause to believe that a violation has 
occurred, the attorney general shall: 
(a) grant leave to bring the proceeding; and 
(b) appoint special counsel to conduct the proceeding. 
(4) (a) If leave is granted, the registered voter may, by a special proceeding 
brought in the district court in the name of the state upon the relation of 
the registered voter, investigate and determine whether or not the 
candidate, candidate's personal campaign committee, any member of the 
candidate's personal campaign committee, or any election officer has 
violated any provision of this title. 
(b) (i) In the proceeding, the complaint shall: 
(A) be served with the summons; and 
(B) set forth the name of the person or persons who have 
allegedly violated this title and the grounds of those violations in 
detail. 
(ii) The complaint may not be amended except by leave of the court, 
(iii) The summons and complaint in the proceeding shall be filed 
with the court no later than five days after they are served. 
(c) (i) The answer to the complaint shall be served and filed within 10 
days after the service of the summons and complaint. 
(ii) Any allegation of new matters in the answer shall be considered 
controverted by the adverse party without reply, and the proceeding 
shall be considered at issue and stand ready for trial upon five days' 
notice of trial. 
(d) (i) All proceedings initiated under this section have precedence over 
any other civil actions. 
(ii) The court shall always be considered open for the trial of the 
issues raised in this proceeding. 
(iii) The proceeding shall be tried and determined as a civil action 
without a jury, with the court determining all issues of fact and issues 
of law. 
(iv) If more than one proceeding is pending or the election of more 
than one person is investigated and contested, the court may: 
(A) order the proceedings consolidated and heard together; and 
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20A-1-704 ELECTION CODE 
(B) equitably apportion costs and disbursements. 
(e) (i) Either party may request a change of venue as provided by law 
in civil actions, but application for a change of venue must be made 
within five days after service of summons and complaint. 
(ii) The judge shall decide the request for a change of venue and 
issue any necessary orders within three days after the application is 
made. 
(iii) If a party fails to request a change of venue within five days of 
service, he has waived his right to a change of venue. 
(f) (i) If judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, the relator may petition 
the judge to recover his taxable costs and disbursements against the 
person whose right to the office is contested. 
(ii) The judge may not award costs to the defendant unless it 
appears that the proceeding was brought in bad faith. 
(iii) Subject to the limitations contained in Subsection (4)(f), the 
judge may decide whether or not to award costs and disbursements. 
(5) Nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any other civil or 
criminal actions or remedies against alleged violators. 
(6) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination, 
testimony and evidence from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 
77, Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity. 
History: C. 1953,20A-1-703, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 2010 amend-
1993, eh. 1, § 46; 1996, ch. 258, § 4; 1997, ch. ment, effective May 11, 2010, substituted "Sub-
296, § 5; 2010, ch. 324, § 50. section (4)(f)" for "Subsection (f)" in (4)(f )(iii). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Complaint. held sufficient to advise defendant as to what 
In contest of election, complaint charging he had to meet and to confer jurisdiction upon 
that defendant, a candidate, contributed $10 to court. Skewes v. Bliss, 58 Utah 51, 196 P. 850 
judge of voting district for political purposes (1921). 
20A-1-704. Judgment and findings — Appeal — Criminal 
prosecution not affected by judgment. 
(1) (a) If the court finds that the candidate whose right to any office is being 
investigated, or that the candidate, the candidate's personal campaign 
committee or any member of the candidate's personal campaign committee 
has violated any provision of this title in the conduct of the campaign for 
nomination or election, and if the candidate is not one mentioned in 
Subsection (2), the judge shall enter an order: 
(i) declaring void the election of the candidate to that office; 
(ii) ousting and excluding the candidate from office; and 
(iii) declaring the office vacant, 
(b) The vacancy created by that order shall be filled as provided in this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) If a proceeding has been brought to investigate the right of a 
candidate for either house of the Legislature, and the court finds that the 
candidate, the candidate's personal campaign committee, or any member 
of the candidate's personal campaign committee has violated any provision 
of this title in the conduct of the campaign for nomination or election, the 
court shall: 
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Rule 1 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 
Part DL Attorneys 
Rule 
73. Attorney fees. 
74. Withdrawal of counsel. 
75. Limited appearance. 
Part X. Dis t r ic t Cour t s a n d Clerks 
76. Notice of contact information change. 
77. District courts and clerks. 
78 to 80. Repealed. 
Part XI. General Provisions 
81. Applicability of rules in general, 




Part XII. Family Law 
Rule 
100. Coordination of cases pending in district 
court and juvenile court. 
101. Motion practice before court commission-
ers. 
102. Motion and order for payment of costs and 
fees. 
10a. Repealed. 
104. Divorce decree upon affidavit. 
105. Shortening 90-day waiting period in do-
mestic matters. 
106. Modification of final domestic relations 
order. 
107. Decree of adoption; Petition to open adop-
tion records. 
Appendix of Forms 
Index to Rules 
PAKT I. SCOPE OF RULES — ONE FORM OF ACTION 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the 
state of Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether 
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except 
as governed by other rules promulgated by this court or enacted by the 
Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally construed 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect. 
They govern all proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the extent that in the 
opinion of the court their application in a particular action pending when the 
rules take effect would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event 
the former procedure applies. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987; November 1, 1996; April 1, 2003; April 1, 
2008.) 
Advisory Commit tee Note . — These rules 
apply to court commissioners to the same ex-
tent as to judges. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2008 amend-
ment deleted former Subdivision (c), which 
read: "Electronic filing. Notwithstanding these 
rules, the court may permit electronic transac-
tions among the parties with the court in court-
supervised pilot projects approved by the Judi-
cial Council." 
Compi ler ' s Notes . — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rules 1 and 86(a), F.R.C.R, 
except that it has been adapted to procedure of 
this state. 
Cross-References. — Children's cases 
deemed civil proceedings, § 78A-6-116. 
Jurisdiction and venue of courts unaffected 
by rules, U.R.C.P. 82. 
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, district 
courts, juvenile courts, and justice courts, Title 
78A, Chapters 3 through 7. 
Supreme Court rulemaking, § 78A-3-103. 
United States, execution of process on land 
acquired by, §§ 63L-1-201, 63L-1-203. 







—Admin i s t r a t ive body. 
The Utah Rules of Civil 
apply to a proceeding before an administrative 
body seeking to regulate activities burdened 
with a public interest. Entre Nous Club v. 
Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P.2d 670 (1955). 
Fede ra l ru les . 
Since these rules were fashioned after the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is proper to 
Procedure do not examine decisions under the federal rules to Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 2 
determine the meanings thereof. Winegar v. 
Slim Olson, Inc., 122 Utah 487, 252 P2d 205 
(1953) (construing Rule 41). 
Noncompliance. 
Noncompliance with rules is allowed only 
when some inadvertence, surprise, excusable 
neglect, or mistake has occurred, and deviation 
is required for substantial justice to be done. 
Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P2d 438 
(1952). 
Cited in Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 
356 P2d 275 (1960); State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 
345, 359 R2d 12 (1961); State ex rel. Road 
Comm'n v. Petty, 17 Utah 2d 382, 412 P2d 914 
(1966); Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189,429 P2d 
39 (1967); Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 
P2d 238 (Utah 1976); Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 
P2d 879 (Utah 1988); Hunter v. Sunrise Title 
Co., 2004 UT 1, 491 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 84 P.3d 
1163. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. 
seq. 
- 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 48 et C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 124 et seq. 
Rule 2. One form of action* 
There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action." 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is identical Joinder of claims in a single action, U.R.C.P. 
in substance to Rule 2, F.R.C.P. 18. 
Cross-References. — Class actions, Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P. 
U.R.C.R 23. 65B(a). 
Consolidation of actions for joint hearing or 
trial, U.R.C.P. 42(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Forms of action. 
—Common-law names. 
—Defective answer. 
Law and equity. 
—Acceleration clause. 
—Equitable defenses. 
— Relief granted. 
Cited. 
Forms of action. 
—Common- law names . 
The common-law names applied to the vari-
ous actions or remedies no longer have any 
practical force or effect, except when the court 
is called upon to give effect to a particular 
statute. O'Neill v. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R., 
38 Utah 475, 114 P. 127 (1911). 
—Defective answer . 
The abolition of forms of action and pleadings 
did not cure an answer so defective that plain-
tiff could not traverse it. Baskin v. Godbe, 1 
Utah 28 (1876). 
Law and equity. 
Pursuant to this rule, equitable principles 
may be applied in an action at law. Marlowe 
Inv. Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124, 485 P2d 
1402 (1971). 
—Acceleration clause. 
Rigid enforcement of acceleration clause in 
note following acceptance of late payments re-
quires reasonable notice and opportunity to 
comply; this equitable doctrine applies to all 
controversies under former Utah Const., Article 
VIII, Sec. 19, which is implemented by this 
rule. Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P. 2d 1145 
(Utah 1976). 
—Equitable defenses . 
Equitable defenses are authorized against 
legal claims. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 
Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 (1924). 
—Relief granted. 
Court could administer relief according to 
nature of cause, whether it would have been 
granted in equity or at law. Morgan v. Child, 
Cole & Co., 47 Utah 417, 155 P. 451 (1916); 
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177 
(1924); Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 
1046 (1927); Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92 
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070 (1936). 
Cited in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 8 et 
seq. 
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 55 to 57. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et Validity of service of summons or complaint 
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423. 
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117, Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
227-229. ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8; made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
66 C.J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading Consequences of prosecution's failure to file 
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78. timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th 
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting new 213. 
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after What constitutes bringing an action to trial 
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute or other activity in case sufficient to avoid 
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191. dismissal under state statute or court rule 
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to requiring such activity within stated time, 32 
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674. A.L.R.4th 840. 
PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hear-
ings, orders. 
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a 
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim; 
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned 
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party 
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court 
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer. 
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court 
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order 
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an exiting order or for 
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show 
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a 
party has violated a court order. 
(c) Memoranda. 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting 
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in 
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition, 
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to 
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other 
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a 
proposed order to its initial memorandum. 
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument 
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of 
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an 
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good 
cause. 
(c)(3) Content 
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no 
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
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(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts tha t is controverted, the opposing 
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by 
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For 
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting 
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain 
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references. 
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions 
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. 
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party 
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision 
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request, 
the motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may 
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit 
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption 
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a 
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action 
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or 
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively 
decided. 
(f) Orders. 
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute 
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment 
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except 
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the 
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or 
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial, 
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an 
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing 
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other 
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to 
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party 
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an 
objection or upon expiration of the time to object. 
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as 
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005; April 
1, 2008; November 1, 2009.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice 
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not 
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain 
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that 
party's motion, memoranda and supporting 
documents and, if so, when and where to de-
liver them. 
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just 
orders upon motion. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2008 amend-
nated former Subdivision (b) as Subdivision 
(b)(1). 
The 2009 amendment deleted former Subdi-
vision (g), providing for the effect of and objec-
tions to recommendations of court commission-
ers. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 7, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-
ings to conform to evidence, motion for, 
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Commencement of action, U.R.C.R 3. 
Consolidation of defenses made by motion, 
U.R.C.R 12(g). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.R 13. 
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.R 12. 
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.R 
12(i). 
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.R 50* 
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.R 41. 
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of 
complaint in, § 78B-6-507. 
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.R 
43(b). 
Execution and proceedings supplemental 
thereto, U.R.C.R 69A et seq. 
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.R 65B. 




Prayer for relief. 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 




—Submission to court. 
Reply memorandum. 
Cited. 
M e m o r a n d u m opposing s u m m a r y judg-
ment . 
Failure of memorandum opposing summary 
judgment to set forth disputed facts in num-
bered sentences in a separate section as re-
quired by former R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B) 
was harmless, as the disputed facts were 
clearly provided in the body of the memoran-
dum with applicable record references. Salt 
Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004 
UT 23, 89 R3d 155. 
Because defendant's memorandum and at-
tachments did not provide a basis for a material 
dispute of fact and neither technically nor sub-
stantially complied with this rule, trial court 
properly deemed the plaintiffs' claimed facts 
uncontroverted. Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Rid-
ing Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 208 P.3d 1077, 
cert, denied, 215 R3d 161, (Utah 2009). 
In a case seeking dedication to the public of a 
private road, the trial court did not err in 
granting a cross-motion for summary judgment 
in favor of several plaintiffs because defendant 
property owner failed to substantially comply 
with this rule; the owner's opposing memoran-
dum did not contain a verbatim restatement of 
each of the facts that the owner sought to 
contest, and the trial court properly considered 
whether the facts deemed admitted met the 
plaintiffs' burden of proof. Jennings Inv., LC v. 
Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT App 119, 208 
P.3d 1077, cert, denied, 215 R3d 161, (Utah 
2009). 
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required, 
§ 78B-6-809. 
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.R 10. 
"Judgment" denned, U.R.C.R 54(a). 
One form of action, U.R.C.R 2. 
Partition of property, complaint to set forth 
interests of all parties, § 78B-6-1202. 
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.R 9. 
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.R 60. 
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.R 11. 
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and 
other papers, U.R.C.R 5. 
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.R 
65B(a). 
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside, 
U.R.C.R 65A. 





Investors who lost money in a failed invest-
ment venture and whose multi-count complaint 
stemming from their losses was dismissed were 
properly denied the opportunity to amend their 
complaint because they never filed an actual 
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without artic-
ulating any reasons why leave to amend their 
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was mer-
ited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 R3d 974. 
Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court may deny a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills 
Hosp., 675 R2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particularization 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 
356 R2d 275 (1960). 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jury and entered conditional order granting 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authority of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days. National Farmers' Union 
Property & Cas. Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P.2d 249, 61 A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Orders. 
—Correction. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own 
motion. Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 5 Utah 2d 
196, 299 P.2d 827 (1956). 
—Necessity. 
Unless the court explicitly directs that no 
order needs to be submitted, no finality will be 
ascribed to a memorandum decision or minute 
entry for purposes of triggering the running of 
the time for appeal. Code v. Utah Dep't of 
Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 P.3d 1097. 
—Submission to court. 
If the prevailing party fails to submit an 
order within the 15-day period required by this 
rule, any party interested in finality, including 
the non-prevailing party, may submit an order. 
Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT 43, 162 
P.3d 1097. 
After entry of orders granting summary judg-
ment, dismissing plaintiff's claims, and deny-
ing defendant's request for attorney fees, a 
separate order was required under this rule. 
Because no proposed order was submitted with 
an initial memorandum, and the court did not 
direct the parties that no additional order was 
necessary, the burden was on defendant, as the 
prevailing party, to prepare the order. When 
defendant failed to meet its burden, plaintiff 
acted appropriately in preparing the order. 
Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, 
201 R3d 966. 
Reply memorandum. 
District court had the discretion to consider 
points raised in a reply memorandum submit-
ted in support of summary judgment although 
the original motion addressed only one cause of 
action, but other causes of action were ad-
dressed in the reply. No supplemental briefing 
was filed after the moving party stated it was 
seeking summary judgment on all of the claims, 
despite a request for leave to supplement an 
opposition document. Dimick v. OHC Liquida-
tion Trust, 2007 UT App 73, 572 Utah Adv. Rep. 
21, 157 R3d 347. 
Cited in Boskovich v. Utah Constr. Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953); Thomas v. Heirs 
of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 (1956); 
Holmes Dev, LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, 48 P.3d 
895; Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2006 UT App 
113, 133 P.3d 438; Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, 
578 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 164 P.3d 366; Tuttle v. 
Olds, 2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 
155 R3d 893; Heideman v. Washington City, 
2007 UT App 11, 155 P.3d 900; Victor Plaster-
ing, Inc. v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 2009 UT 
App 98; Express Recovery Servs. v. Hester, 
2009 UT App 94; Cheap-O-Rooter, Inc. v. Mar-
malade Square Condo. Homeowners Ass'n, 
2009 UT App 329, 643 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 221 
P3d 898. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders § 1 et seq.; 61AAm. Jur. 2d 
Pleading §§ 31 et seq., 665. 
C.J.S. — 60 C J . S . Motions and Orders § 1 et 
seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 63 to 210, 140 et 
seq., 211 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summary judgment 
as affected by presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1361. 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action as 
affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether 
an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain 
(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief; and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems 
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be 
demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms his 
defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon 
which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or information 
sufficient to form a belief as to the t ru th of an averment, he shall so state and 
this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of the 
averments denied. When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a part or 
a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and 
material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends in good 
faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he may make 
his denials as specific denials of designated averments or paragraphs, or he 
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eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. Fed. for securities fraud, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 107. 
107. Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
 e r a i Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to signing and verification of pleadings, in actions 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions
 for i n n i c t i on of emotional distress, 98 A.L.R. 
for defamation, 95 A.L.R. Fed. 181. p e ( j 442 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed-
 T" .'. « ,. J r> 1 11 1? J 
i V> i r n- i r> J ^ • • 4. Imposition ol sanctions under Rule 11, fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to , V> , r #-•• -i n J J. - ' I 
signing and verification of pleadings, in action e r a l . R u l e s / C™1 Procedure, pertaining to 
for wrongful discharge from employment, 96 S 1 ^ m g a n d verification of pleadings, in anti-
A L R Fed. 13. t r u s t a c t i o n s > " A.L.R. Fed. 573. 
Imposition of sanctions under Rule 11, Fed- Procedural requirements for imposition of 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, pertaining to sanctions under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil 
signing and verification of pleadings, in actions Procedure, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 556. 
Rule 12. Defenses and objections. 
(a) Whe?i presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the 
court, a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service 
of the summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty 
days after service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. 
A party served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer 
thereto within twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply 
to a counterclaim in the answer within twenty days after service of the answer 
or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within twenty days after service of the 
order, unless the order otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this 
rule alters these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by 
order of the court, but a motion directed to fewer than all of the claims in a 
pleading does not affect the time for responding to the remaining claims: 
(a)(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days 
after notice of the court's action; 
(a)(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the 
responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the 
more definite statement. 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of 
service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these 
defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No 
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses 
or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the 
denial of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to 
which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the 
adverse party may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim 
for relief. If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for 
failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, 
the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but 
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on 
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders 
that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial. 
(e) Motion for more definite statement. If a pleading to which a responsive 
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably 
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more 
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall 
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is 
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of 
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike 
the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just. 
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court 
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redun-
dant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule 
may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a 
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses 
and objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, 
the party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or 
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not 
presented either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure 
to join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal 
defense to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or 
by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and 
except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise 
that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss 
the action. The objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after 
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a 
waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination 
by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990; November 1, 2000.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 12, F.R.C.P. U.R.C.P. 7. 
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Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
General and special appearances. 
Statute of frauds. 
Venue. 
— When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
— Failure to file. 
Standard of review. 
Statute of limitations. 
Summary judgment. 
— Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
—Court's discretion. 
— Court's initiative. 
— Defenses. 
— Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
— Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
— Defect of parties. 
— Defective service of process. 
— Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
When issues raised. 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
—Failure to pay consideration. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Statute of frauds. 
—Statute of limitations. 
—Waiver. 
Cited. 
Jurisdiction over the pe rson . 
When urging the trial court to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction based only on documentary 
evidence, a plaintiff must make only a prima 
facie showing that the trial court has personal 
jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in 
order to proceed to trial on the merits. Ander-
son v. American Soc'y of Plastic Surgeons, 807 
P.2d 825 (Utah 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 
900, 112 S. Ct. 276, 116 L. Ed. 2d 228 (1991). 
Trial court erred in granting a Nevada casi-
no's motion to dismiss a Utah patron's personal 
injury suit, where the patron's complaint al-
leged sufficient facts to support general per-
sonal jurisdiction over the casino by the State of 
Utah. Ho v. Jim's Enters., Inc., 2001 UT 63, 29 
P.3d 633. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
Motion for judgment on the pleadings to 
decide upon distribution of trust assets was 
inappropriate in a proceeding among trust ben-
eficiaries to determine distribution and offsets. 
Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, 46 P.3d 
233, aff'd, 2004 UT 22, 89 P3d 148. 
Trial court properly granted judgment on the 
pleadings to defendant restaurants in wrongful 
death action alleging negligence and negligence 
per se against the restaurants for furnishing 
alcohol to decedent, plaintiffs' son, who later 
died when he lost control of his car, because 
Utah does not recognize a common-law, first-
party action against dramshops for injuries 
suffered by an intoxicated person. Miller v. 
Gastronomy, Inc., 2005 UT App 80, 110 P.3d 
144. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Answers to interrogatories are not a part of 
the pleadings for purposes of judgment on the 
pleadings and if the court considers them the 
other party must have the privilege of offering 
answering affidavits as upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. Securities Credit Corp. v. 
Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422 (1953). 
Rights of opposing party. 
On review of a motion on the pleadings 
treated as a motion for summary judgment 
under Subdivision (c), the party against whom 
the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented, and all the infer-
ences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a 
light most favorable to him. Young v. Texas Co., 
8 Utah 2d 206, 331 P2d 1099 (1958). 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
A motion for a more definite statement, and 
not discovery procedures, is the appropriate 
means of obtaining the information formerly 
sought by a bill of particulars. Securities Credit 
Corp. v. Willey, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P2d 422 
(1953). 
—Criteria. 
A motion for a more definite statement is 
properly made only when the complaint is in-
definite, ambiguous, or vague in either factual 
allegations or legal theory to such an extent 
that the moving party cannot reasonably be 
required to frame his responsive pleading. Li-
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quor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 
243 R2d 441 (1952). 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
Where the complaint states a claim in gen-
eral language but is not sufficiently definite in 
certain respects to enable defendant to answer, 
the proper remedy is a motion for a more 
definite statement, not a motion to dismiss. 
Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 Utah 457, 
243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
A motion for a more definite statement 
should be summarily dealt with if made for the 
purpose of delay. Liquor Control Comm'n v. 
Athas, 121 Utah 457, 243 P.2d 441 (1952). 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motions for a more definite statement are not 
properly used to obtain evidence from the 
pleader. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 121 
Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952). 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim. 
—Conversion. 
Trial court erroneously characterized defen-
dant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for a judg-
ment on the pleadings, which was improper 
because defendants' memorandum and attach-
ments were not pleadings. Because the plain-
tiffs stated a claim for negligence upon which 
relief could be granted, the dismissal of that 
claim could not be justified under Rule 12(b)(6). 
The court should have converted the motion 
into one for summary judgment. Tuttle v. Olds, 
2007 UT App 10, 569 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 155 
P3d 893. 
—Explained. 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
admits the facts alleged in the complaint but 
challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based on 
those facts. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Bene-
dict's Hosp., 811 P2d 194 (Utah 1991); Russell 
v. Standard Corp., 898 P2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
—Habeas corpus. 
Although Rule 65B generally governs the 
drafting, filing, and disposition of habeas cor-
pus petitions, Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule 
applies to habeas corpus petitions in which 
petitioner fails to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 
P.2d 987 (Utah 1997). 
— Improper. 
Dismissal of defendant's counterclaim was 
reversed because the record did not persuade 
the appeals court that there was no set of facts 
under which the defendant might succeed. Ol-
son v. Park-Craig-Olson, Inc., 815 R2d 1356 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (claim of unjust enrich-
ment if no reimbursement for payment made 
on loan guarantee). 
In a wrongful death action based on attrac-
tive nuisance doctrine, the term "aquatic trap" 
in complaint could reasonably be construed to 
refer to a hidden traD and complaint was suffi-
American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). 
Complaint for wrongful death, alleging that 
the injuries and death occurred because of a 
defective irrigation ditch and its associated 
channelling devices, bridges, currents, and 
trappings and that as a further direct and 
proximate result of the defective and unreason-
ably dangerous condition of the irrigation ditch, 
plaintiffs suffered damages for loss of financial 
support, comfort, society, advice, care, compan-
ionship, affection and happiness of association 
of the decedent, contained allegations of causa-
tion sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 
Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 ' * 
R2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court erred in dismissing the plain-
tiff's case because her allegation of facts con-
cerning each element of the claim of breach of 
contract was sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss. Mackey v. Cannon, 996 P2d 1081 
(Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
Representative's case was improperly dis-
missed because her complaint was sufficient 
and the defendants below never argued that 
the complaint was inadequate; the trial court 
inappropriately relied on factual determina-
tions from the evidentiary hearing to dismiss 
the case. Cazares v. Cosby, 2003 UT 3, 65 P3d 
1184. 
Trial court erred in dismissing claims for 
fraud, concealment, and other intentional torts 
on the grounds that they were barred by the 
applicable statutes of limitations in Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3) and 78-12-26(3). Whether 
the plaintiff made a prima facie showing that a 
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered 
the claims earlier was a factual finding that 
should be decided by a jury, not a judge. Rus-
sell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 
316, 482 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 78 P3d 616, aff'd, 
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741. 
Dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6) of claim 
for injuries suffered at a state liquor store was 
improper; the claim did provide a brief state-
ment of the facts as required by the relevant 
governmental immunity provision. Peeples v. 
State, 2004 UT App 328, 509 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 
100 P.3d 254. 
—Negligence. 
To bring a successful negligence claim, a 
plaintiff must establish, among other things, 
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiff, and failure to show a duty is fatal to a 
negligence claim. Thus, dismissal under Subdi-
vision (b)(6) is proper when a plaintiff has 
complained of negligence, but no factual situa-
tion could possibly create a legal duty of care 
between the defendant and plaintiff. Williams 
v. Bench, 2008 UT App 306, 193 P.3d 640. 
—Parties. 
Adoption agencies' declaratory judgment ac-
tion against an association that had issued an 
advisory opinion on the applicability of an in-
terstate compact failed to state a claim against 
the association because, although the associa-
tion's position was adopted by state officials, its 
opinion was not binding on anyone. Alternative 
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2004 UT App 488, 516 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 106 
P.3d 744. 
—Proper. 
Trial court did not err in granting bank's 
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
where the plaintiff's complaint failed to allege 
sufficient facts to support a negligence action; 
the depository bank did not owe the plaintiff, as 
a non-customer of the bank, a duty of care after 
another person forged the plaintiff's signature 
and deposited the checks at the bank. Ramsey 
v. Hancock, 2003 UT App 319, 483 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 10, 79 P.3d 423. 
Trial court properly dismissed a complaint 
that was entirely and exclusively dependent on 
the plaintiff's misunderstanding of the defen-
dant's legal obligations toward her and that 
failed to plead a cognizable and actionable 
claim. Pett v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 2004 UT App 
150, 91 R3d 854. 
Patient's claim was properly dismissed be-
cause the patient's risk of recurrence of breast 
cancer was not an injury; the patient's claim for 
the increased risk of recurrence of cancer was 
not actionable. Medved v. Glenn, 2004 UT App 
161, 499 Utah Adv. Rep. 25, 92 R3d 176. 
Church's motion to dismiss was granted in a 
negligence case because it had no common law 
duty to warn abuse victims about a priest's 
prior child sexual abuse. There was no special 
relationship between the parties giving rise to 
such a duty, the abuse did not occur on church 
property or during church functions, and the 
priest was not a church employee, agent, or 
clergy member. Doe v. Corp. of the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints, 2004 UT App 274, 506 Utah Adv. 25, 98 
P3d 429, cert, denied, 106 P3d 743 (Utah 
2004). 
Business's complaint against the Utah De-
partment of Transportation, following the clo-
sure of an access route to the business during a 
highway reconstruction project, failed to state a 
claim for inverse condemnation under Utah 
Const., Art. I, § 22; the business did not have a 
protectable property interest in an easement of 
access through the blocked routes and the busi-
ness was accessible from another route during 
the reconstruction project. Intermountain 
Sports, Inc. v. DOT, 2004 UT App 405, 512 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40, 103 P.3d 716, cert, denied, 109 
R3d 804 (Utah 2005), cert, denied, 546 U.S. 
817, 126 S. Ct. 343, 163 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2005). 
— S t a n d a r d . 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the court must construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences 
in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991); Russell v. 
Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
— S t a n d a r d of review. 
When reviewing a judgment entered on a 
motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6), the 
Court of Appeals is obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable infer-
ences in its favor. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons 
Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991). 
A motion to dismiss under Subdivision (b)(6) 
will be affirmed only if it appears to a certainty 
that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief 
under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & 
Sons Co, 790 P.2d 107 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Prows v. State, 822 R2d 764 (Utah 1991); 
Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & 
Cas. Ins. Co , 890 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1995). 
When reviewing a dismissal under this rule, 
an appellate court must accept the material 
allegations of the complaint as true, and the 
trial court's ruling should be affirmed only if it 
clearly appears that the plaintiff can prove no 
set of facts in support of his claim. Colman v. 
Utah State Land Bd, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990); 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 
P.2d 742 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 853 
P.2d 897 (Utah 1993); Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
Because the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dis-
missal is a question of law, the appellate court 
gives the trial court's ruling no deference and 
reviews it under a correctness standard. St. 
Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp, 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1991); Wright v. University of 
Utah, 876 P.2d 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Rus-
sell v. Standard Corp, 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 
1995); Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co, 
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). 
In determining whether the trial court prop-
erly granted a motion to dismiss, the appellate 
court must accept the factual allegations in the 
complaint as true and consider all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from those facts in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Prows v. 
State, 822 P.2d 764 (Utah 1991); Whipple v. 
American Fork Irrigation Co, 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). 
Father did not dispute that the dismissal of 
his prior paternity action was a final judgment 
on the merits for purposes of claim preclusion, 
but merely argued that he did not authorize his 
prior attorney to dismiss the first action; how-
ever, the father's second complaint contained 
no allegation that dismissal of his prior action 
was not authorized. Because the father's sec-
ond litigation was decided on Rule 12(b) motion 
to dismiss, an appellate court did not consider 
factual allegations outside the complaint. (Un-
published decision.) Belloso v. Lindberg, 2005 
UT App 132, cert, denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 
2005). 
Motion to dismiss for lack of venue . 
— Forum-select ion c lause in cont rac t . 
The parties' prior agreement in the contract 
that is the subject of the dispute as to the place 
of the action will be given effect unless it is 
unfair or unreasonable. Prows v. Pinpoint Re-
tail Sys , 868 P.2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
A plaintiff who brings an action in violation of 
a choice-of-forum provision bears the burden of 
proving that enforcing the clause is unfair or 
unreasonable; to meet this burden, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the chosen state would 
be so seriously an inconvenient forum that to 
require the plaintiff to bring suit there would 
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be unjust. Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys., 868 
P.2d 809 (Utah 1993). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting the franchisers' motion to dismiss the 
franchisees' breach of contract claim under 
Subdivision (b)(3) where the franchisees failed 
to meet their burden of demonstrating that the 
forum selection clause in the signed agreement 
was unfair or unreasonable; the franchisees did 
not show that suit in Arkansas rather than 
Utah would be difficult and inconvenient. 
Coombs v. Juice Works Dev., Inc., 2003 UT App 
388, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 81 P.3d 769. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—Assigned claims. 
Assigned claims of breach of fiduciary duty 
and breach of contract alleged by investors who 
lost money in a failed investment venture were 
properly dismissed because the investors failed 
to plead damages to a corporation that had 
assigned its claims to the investors. Coroles v. 
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
79 P.3d 974. 
—Fraud. 
Primary fraud, securities fraud, and second-
ary fraud claims alleged by investors who lost 
money in a failed investment venture were 
properly dismissed because the investors failed 
to plead with particularity, as required by Rule 
9(b), in complaint that merely listed facts and 
then recited the elements of fraud. Coroles v. 
Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
79 P3d 974. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Since an affirmative defense raises matters 
outside the scope of plaintiff's prima facie case, 
any matter that does not tend to controvert the 
opposing party's prima facie case should be 
pleaded and is not put in issue by denial pur-
suant to Rule 8(b). Gill v. Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 
(Utah 1986). 
The Limitation of Landowner Liability Act 
(§ 57-14-1 et seq.) is an "affirmative defense" or 
an "avoidance" in a wrongful death action alleg-
ing negligence, and, to preserve the act as a 
defense, it must be raised in the defendant's 
answer. Golding v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 
793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). 
Divorce. 
Trial court did not err in refusing defendant's 
motion to dismiss and for a more definite state-
ment in answer to plaintiff's divorce petition 
alleging cruelty and habitual intoxication in 
general terms. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 
Utah 573, 236 P2d 1066 (1951). 
Election of remedies. 
The defense of election of remedies is an 
affirmative one that must be raised by way of 
answer, motion, or demand and may not be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Royal Re-
sources, Inc. v. Gibralter Fin. Corp., 603 P.2d 
793 (Utah 1979). 
Failure to state claim upon which re-
unless it appears to a certainty that the plain-
tiff would be entitled to no relief under any 
state of facts which could be proved in support 
of the claim. Liquor Control Comm'n v. Athas, 
121 Utah 457, 243 P2d 441 (1952); Christensen 
v. Lelis Automatic Transmission Serv., Inc., 24 
Utah 2d 165, 467 P.2d 605 (1970). 
A complaint is required to give the opposing 
party fair notice of the nature and basis or 
grounds of the claim and a general indication of 
the type of litigation involved, or it is subject to 
dismissal under Subdivision (b)(6). Utah Steel 
& Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 475 P.2d 
1019 (1970). 
Action against city for breach of implied 
contract was properly dismissed for failure to 
state claim upon which relief could be granted, 
since the contract to review bids on an equal 
basis was too nebulous to be enforceable, and 
the city is immune to tort action for deceit. 
Rapp v. Salt Lake City, 527 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1974). 
In an unlawful detainer action in which the 
notice is defective, the defective notice results 
in a failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted rather than lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction. Sovereen v. Meadows, 595 
P.2d 852 (Utah 1979). 
General and special appearances. 
The distinction between general and special 
appearances has been abolished by Subdivision 
(b) of this rule. Ted R. Brown & Assocs. v. 
Carnes Corp., 547 P2d 206 (Utah 1976). 
Statute of frauds. 
The defense of the statute of frauds is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded pur-
suant to Rule 8(c) and may not be raised by a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision (b) of 
this rule. W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas, 
24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970). 
Venue. 
A motion to dismiss is not the correct form for 
objecting to venue improperly laid; an objection 
to venue should be made by a motion for change 
of place of trial. Cannon v. Tuft, 3 Utah 2d 410, 
285 P2d 843 (1955). 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Motion for leave to file an amended answer 
was properly denied where movant failed to file 
anything in support of the motion and did not 
call the motion for hearing until the case was 
called for trial four months later. Hein's Turkey 
Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 
24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (1970). 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
An objection raised that security for costs 
was not filed within one month after notice is at 
best but a technical one. Dismissal of action 
with prejudice was an abuse of discretion since 
the policy of the law is to minimize the effect of 
technical objections which do not go to the 
morif c QnH arp nnt. nreiudicial to the interests of 
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Ford Contractors, 2 Utah 2d 275, 272 R2d 191 
(1954). 
Where plaintiff died 16 days after initiating 
suit, and 11 days after demand of a nonresident 
cost bond under Subdivision (j), and, though 
almost three months later, a surety bond was 
filed as soon as an administrator was ap-
pointed, trial court should not dismiss action 
for failure to file bond within 30 days. Ham-
mond v. Calder, 8 Utah 2d 333, 334 R2d 562, 
cert, denied, 361 U.S. 813, 80 S. Ct. 51, 4 L. Ed. 
2d 60 (1959). 
Standard of review. 
The propriety of a dismissal under this rule is 
a question of law, reviewable for correctness. 
Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, 987 R2d 
602. 
Statute of limitations. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
considering information outside of the com-
plaint for purposes of the relevant date of the 
inception of the loss for statute of limitations 
purposes. Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 R3d 947. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
Motion to dismiss pursuant to Subdivision 
(b)(6) may be converted to summary judgment 
only when it appears as a matter of law that the 
plaintiff cannot recover; and where there was a 
question of actual knowledge of defendant as to 
the claim against the property, motion to dis-
miss and summary judgment were improper. 
Harvey v. Sanders, 534 P.2d 905 (Utah 1975). 
Motion for dismissal in action for declaratory 
judgment as to constitutionality and legality of 
annexation conditions properly treated as mo-
tion for summary judgment. See Child v. City of 
Spanish Fork, 538 P.2d 184 (Utah 1975). 
It is generally not well advised to treat a 
motion to dismiss as one for summary judg-
ment. Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 570 
P2d 119 (Utah 1977). 
Where defendant's motion was initially for 
dismissal because of plaintiff's failure to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted, once 
matters outside the pleadings were presented 
to and not excluded by the trial court, the 
motion was properly treated as one for sum-
mary judgment. Lind v. Lynch, 665 P2d 1276 
(Utah 1983); Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 
874 P2d 120 (Utah 1994). 
If a trial court cannot on its own motion 
convert a Rule 12 motion to dismiss to a Rule 56 
motion for summary judgment, then certainly 
the Supreme Court should not allow the mov-
ing party to do so on appeal. Colman v. Utah 
State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
When affidavits or other evidence is pre-
sented to support a motion to dismiss under 
Subdivision (b)(6) of this rule and the court 
does not exclude them, the motion is generally 
treated as a motion for summary judgment 
pursuant to U.R.C.P. 56. DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, 
Ross & Co., 926 R2d 835 (Utah 1996). 
This rule does not convert motions based on 
subdivisions (b)(1) through (5) into motions for 
summary judgment simply because they in-
clude some affirmative evidence relating to the 
basis for the motion. Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 
82, 987 P.2d 36; Walter v. Stewart, 2003 UT App 
86, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 
(2003). 
—Court's discretion. 
If a motion to dismiss under Subdivision 
(b)(6) is presented, the decision to consider 
matters outside the pleadings initially lies in 
the discretion of the trial court. Strand v. Asso-
ciated Students of Univ. of Utah, 561 P2d 191 
(Utah 1977). 
—Court's initiative. 
A court should not, on its own initiative, try 
to convert a motion for dismissal into one for 
summary judgment by requesting additional 
evidence. Hill ex rel. Fogel v. Grand Cent., Inc., 
25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 150 (1970). 
—Defenses. 
Defenses which have not been raised by the 
answer or by proper motion may not be raised 
in an affidavit in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment. Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). 
— Opportunity to present pertinent mate-
rial. 
Once the trial court makes a determination 
to consider materials outside the pleading upon 
a motion to dismiss, the mandatory provision of 
Subdivision (b) controls and all parties must be 
given adequate notice and opportunity to sub-
mit supporting materials, particularly the 
party against whom the motion has been made. 
Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah, 
561 P.2d 191 (Utah 1977). 
It is necessary that the record clearly and 
affirmatively demonstrate that, when a motion 
to dismiss is made and matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, all parties are given reasonable op-
portunity to present additional pertinent mate-
rial if they wish. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah 
Farm Prod. Credit Ass'n, 587 P2d 151 (Utah 
1978). 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute 
averments on other side of controversy and 
create issue of fact, precluding summary judg-
ment. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P2d 191 
(Utah 1975). 
Waiver of defenses. 
—Defect of parties. 
Any objection to a defect of parties is waived, 
if not asserted by a party as provided in Subdi-
vision (h). Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 
1976). 
—Defective service of process. 
The affirmative defense of defective service of 
process was waived by defendant, who failed to 
raise the defense in its motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction and did not raise the issue 
during a summary judgment hearing, but 
raised it for the first time on anneal Waf-.lHsa &-
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Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 
1991). 
The trial court erred in ruling that plaintiffs7 
failure to comply with the indorsement provi-
sion of § 78-36-8, which requires court indorse-
ment of the summons, barred their action un-
der Utah's forcible entry and detainer statute. 
Defendant, by answering plaintiffs5 complaint 
without raising the defense of insufficiency of 
process and by proceeding through trial and the 
verdict before raising that defense, waived it 
under Subdivision (h) of this rule. Fowler v. 
Seiter, 838 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Keller v. Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 
P.2d 102 (Utah 1998). 
—Exceptions. 
Subject matter jurisdiction. 
Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction 
may be raised at any time and cannot be 
waived by the parties. This prohibition against 
waiver applies only to subject matter jurisdic-
tion and is consistent with federal law. Barnard 
v. Wassermann, 855 P2d 243 (Utah 1993). 
When issues raised. 
Issues brought under the exceptions of Sub-
division (h) may be raised before or during trial. 
Subdivision (h) does not mean that failure to 
state a claim can be raised for the first time on 
appeal. Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P. 2d 763 (Utah 
1985). 
—Failure to join indispensable party. 
When a party asserts the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party for the first time at 
the trial on the merits, it should be disposed of 
as provided in Rule 15(b). Papanikolas Bros. 
Enters, v. Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 
535 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1975). 
— Failure to pay consideration. 
Failure to pay consideration on a negotiable 
instrument is an affirmative defense which is 
required, under Rule 8(c), to be pleaded; and 
unless it is pleaded, pursuant to Subdivision (h) 
of this rule, it ordinarily will be considered 
waived as a defense, unless there is a motion to 
amend, or the parties acquiesce in the trial of 
that issue, or the plaintiff is otherwise given 
notice and an opportunity to meet the issue. 
Olpin v. Grove Fin. Co., 521 P2d 1221 (Utah 
1974). 
—Mutual mistake. 
Mutual mistake is an affirmative defense as 
it raises matters outside the plaintiff's prima 
facie case, and the failure to assert it is a 
waiver of that defense. Mabey v. Kay Peterson 
Constr. Co., 682 P2d 287 (Utah 1984). 
— Statute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds is an affirmative de-
fense which must be set forth in the pleadings, 
else it is waived. Phillips v. JCM Dev. Corp., 666 
P2d 876 (Utah 1983). 
—Statute of limitations. 
In an action by water user challenging 
charges of water district, plaintiff waived thir-
i... J_-_ !_•___ :*-„*.: ~i-~4-„i-~ /X. 1 7 A O Q1 C^ K^r 
counterclaim. Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 
Utah 2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962). 
The statute of limitations defense must be 
pleaded as an affirmative defense in a respon-
sive pleading, or it is waived, unless an 
amended pleading asserting the defense is al-
lowed pursuant to the requirements of Rule 
15(a). Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irriga-
tion Co., 664 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1983); Keller v. 
Southwood N. Med. Pavilion, Inc., 959 P.2d 102 
(Utah 1998). 
—Waiver. 
Where plaintiff sought to rescind a contract 
to purchase a business from defendant on 
ground that the agreement was procured by 
fraud, and defendant claimed that any fraud 
had been waived by plaintiff's continued oper-
ation of the business, the allegation of waiver 
was an affirmative defense which should have 
been pleaded, and failure to do so constituted a 
waiver of the defense under this rule. Bezner v. 
Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 P2d 898 
(Utah 1976). 
Cited in Farrell v. Mennen Co., 120 Utah 
377, 235 P.2d 128 (1951); Howard v. Town of 
North Salt Lake, 3 Utah 2d 189, 281 P.2d 216 
(1955); Thomas v. Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 
57, 305 P2d 507 (1956); Bench v. Equitable Life 
Assurance Soc'y, 21 Utah 2d 160, 442 P2d 924 
(1968); Manger v. Davis, 619 P2d 687 (Utah 
1980); Prat t v. City Council, 639 P2d 172 (Utah 
1981); Carnes v. Carnes, 668 P2d 555 (Utah 
1983); Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P2d 612 
(Utah 1984); Charlie Brown Constr. Co. v. Lei-
sure Sports Inc., 740 P2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P2d 311 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
754 P2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Arrow Indus., Inc. v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1988); Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 
668 (Utah 1989); Weber v. Snyderville West, 
800 P2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 
815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991); Moffitt v. Barr, 837 
P2d 572 (Utah C t App. 1992); DeBry v. Valley 
Mtg. Co., 835 P2d 1000 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Atiya v. Salt Lake County, 852 P2d 1007 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993); Richards Irrigation Co. v. 
Karren, 880 P.2d 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Cruz v. 
Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 
1252 (Utah 1996); Hebertson v. Willowcreek 
Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996); Valley 
Colour, Inc., v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 
361 (Utah 1997); Harper v. Summit County, 963 
P.2d 768 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), aff'd, 2001 UT 
10, 26 P.3d 193; Busche v. Salt Lake County, 
2001 UT App 111, 26 P.3d 862; United States v. 
Smith, 225 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (D. Utah 2002); 
IHC Health Servs. v. D & K Mgmt., 2003 UT 5, 
469 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 73 P.3d 320; Tom Heal 
Commer. Real Estate v. Overton, 2005 UT App 
257, 116 P.3d 965; Lunceford v. Lunceford, 2006 
UT App 266, 139 P.3d 1073; LPM Corp. v. 
Smith, 2006 UT App 258, 139 P.3d 292; 
Cantamar, L.L.C. v. Champagne, 2006 UT App 
321, 142 P3d 140; Tan v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 
2007 UT App 93, 573 P.3d 29; Orlob v. Wasatch 
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Angel Investors, LLC v. Garrity, 2009 UT 40, 
216 R3d 944. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs §§ 46 et What, other than affidavits, constitutes "mat-
seq., 86; 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading §§ 125 et - ters outside the pleadings," which may convert 
seq., 161 to 167, 209 to 222, 225, 230 to 237, motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
280, 389 et seq. 12(b), (c) into motion for summary judgment, 2 
C.J.S. — 20 C.J.S. Costs §§ 128, 133, 136, A . L . R . Fed. 1027. 
138, 143, 144 162 et seq., 173; 27 C J S. Dis- j o i n d e r of counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or 
missal and Nonsuit § 67; 71 C J.S^Pleading
 1 3 ( b ) rf F e d e r a l R u l e g o f C i v i l P r o c e d u r e w i t h 
§§ 99 et seq., 112 to 116, 121 to 129, 264 to 268, : 1 ] r i s f i i p t : o n a i A9f9n^ unApr R l l i P wh) as 
424 to 449, 463 to 482, 498, 508, 560 to 586. Jurisdictional defense under M e l b ) as 
A T o r>- -U4.4. I 4. j * • I v • i waiver of such defense, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 388. 
A.L.R. — Right to voluntary dismissal of civil ' 
action as affected by opponent's motion for Necessity of oral argument on motion for 
summary judgment, judgment on the plead- summary judgment on pleadings in federal 
ings, or directed verdict, 36 A.L.R.3d 1113. c o u r t> 1 0 5 A L R - F e d - 7 5 5 -
Rule 13. Counterclaim and cross-claim. 
(a) Compulsory counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any 
claim which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any 
opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject-matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its 
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the 
action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or 
(2) the opposing party brought suit upon his claim by attachment or other 
process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal 
judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under 
this Rule 13. 
(b) Permissive counterclaim. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occur-
rence that is the subject-matter of the opposing party's claim. 
(c) Counterclaim exceeding opposing claim. A counterclaim may or may not 
diminish or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party. It may claim 
relief exceeding in amount or different in kind from that sought in the pleading 
of the opposing party. 
(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after pleading. A claim which either 
matured or was acquired by the pleader after serving his pleading may, with 
the permission of the court, be presented as a counterclaim by supplemental 
pleading. 
(e) Omitted counterclaim. When a pleader fails to set up a counterclaim 
through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice re-
quires, he may by leave of court set up the counterclaim by amendment. 
(f) Cross-claim against co-party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any 
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or 
occurrence that is the subject-matter either of the original action or of a 
counterclaim therein or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of 
the original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party 
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or 
part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. 
(g) Additional parties may be brought in. When the presence of parties other 
than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief 
in the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order 
them to be brought in as defendants as provided in these rules, if jurisdiction 
of them can be obtained. 
(h) Separate judgments. Judgment on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be 
rendered in accordance with the terms of Rule 54(b), even if the claims of the 
opposing party have been dismissed or otherwise disposed of. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Appeal. 
—Default judgments. 





The time for taking an appeal from a default 
judgment in the former city courts (now circuit 
courts) dated from notice of entry of the judg-
ment and not from the date of the entry of 
judgment in the city court. Buckner v. Main 
Realty & Ins. Co., 4 Utah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 
(1955). 
Notice of orders or judgments. 
This rule prohibits any court from finding 
excusable neglect based solely on a court clerk's 
failure to mail notice; however it does not mean 
that, in a situation where the clerk failed to 
send notice, no other facts can be combined 
with that fact to find there was excusable 
neglect. West v. Grand County, 942 R2d 337 
(Utah 1997). 
—Default j udgment s. 
It was unnecessary to mail notice of contempt 
findings to ex-wife who had ignored the notice 
of hearing and had refused to appear. Peterson 
v. Peterson, 530 R2d 821 (Utah 1974). 
Cited in Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Jensen, 
656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 15A Am. Jur. 2d Clerks of 
Court §§ 14, 22, 24, 25; 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts 
§§ 16 et seq., 42 et seq., 61; 56 Am. Jur. 2d 
Motions, Rules, and Orders § 39; 75 Am. Jur. 
2d Trial § 33. 
C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 236 et seq.; 49 
C.J.S. Judgments § 112; 60 C.J.S. Motions and 
Orders § 61; 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 30, 38, 39. 
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to 
liability against defaulting defendant, 8 
A.L.R.3d 1070. 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus-
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d 
1272. 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam-
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Opening default or default judgment claimed 
to have been obtained because of attorney's 
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, 
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255. 
Validity and construction of constitution or 
statute authorizing exclusion of public in sex 
offense cases, 39 A.L.R.3d 852. 
Right of accused to have press or other media 
representatives excluded from criminal trial, 
49 A.L.R.3d 1007. 
Power of court to impose standard of personal 
appearance or attire, 73 A.L.R.3d 353. 
What amounts to "appearance" under statute 
or rule requiring notice, to party who has "ap-
peared," of intention to take default judgment, 
73 A.L.R.3d 1250. 
Applicability of judicial immunity to acts of 
clerk of court under state law, 34 A.L.R.4th 
1186. 
Rules 78 to 80. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 78, relating to motion day, 
Rule 79, relating to books and records kept by 
the clerk, and Rule 80, relating to reporters and 
record transcripts, were repealed by order of 
the Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991. 
PART XI. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings in 
uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all proceed-
ings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement of 
any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Application to small claims. These rules shall not apply to small 
proceedings except as expressly incorporated in the Small Claims Rules. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administrative board 
or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in appealing 
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Machine-generated OCR, m y contain errors.
305 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 81 
from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of an 
administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or 
inconsistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall also 
govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement. 
(Amended effective November 1, 2001.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule corresponds 
to Rule 81, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Administrative Rule-
making Act, Title 63G, Chapter 3. 
Administrative proceedings. 
Adoption proceedings. 
City and justices' courts. 
Criminal proceedings. 
Special statutory proceedings. 
Cited. 
Administrative proceedings. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are inap-
plicable to a proceeding before an administra-
tive body seeking to regulate activities bur-
dened with a public interest. Entre Nous Club 
v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 287 P2d 670 (1955). 
Where road commission's order that sign be 
removed had been followed by negotiations and 
correspondence between parties as advertiser 
sought modification of order, district court had 
jurisdiction to review order in proceedings in-
stituted within thirty days of commission's def-
inite and final refusal to change its order, 
notwithstanding that notice of the order had 
been given advertiser several months before. 
National Adv. Co. v. Utah State lid. Comm'n, 26 
Utah 2d 132, 486 P.2d 383 (1971). 
Where plaintiff sought declaratory judgment 
as to the nature of the legal relationship be-
tween the No-Fault Insurance Act and the 
Workmen's Compensation Act and no facts 
were required to be pleaded or proved, there 
was no need to exhaust tbe administrative 
remedies prior to seeking a declaratory judg-
ment. IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 
296 (Utah 1975), overruled on other grounds, 
Neel v. State, 889 R2d 922 (Utah 1995). 
Although the Insurance Code specifically out-
lines procedures governing appeals from the 
Insurance Commissioner's decisions, there is 
nothing therein which is inconsistent or in 
conflict with the application of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure which provide for a limit on the 
time to appeal. Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Eq-
uitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 579 P2d 1327 
(Utah 1978). 
The one-month time limit for appeals in 
former Rule 73 applied to appeals from the 
Insurance Commissioner's decisions under the 
former Insurance Code, since the statutory 
scheme (former §§ 31-4-9 and 31-4-11) failed to 
provide for any limit. Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. 
Eauitable Life Assurance SocV. 579 P.2d 1327 
Justice courts generally, Title 78A, Chapter 
5. 
Uniform Probate Code, Title 75. 
An appeal from the Utah Transportation 
Commission is governed by Subdivision (d) and, 
thus, must be made within 30 days of the 
Commission's notice to a litigant of its decision. 
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah Dep't of 
Transp., 589 P.2d 782 (Utah 1979). 
This rule does not make the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure apply to administrative pro-
ceedings; rather, it makes clear that state 
courts reviewing administrative cases are gov-
erned by the rules of procedure. Frito-Lay v. 
Utah Labor Comm'n, 2009 UT 71, 222 P.3d*55. 
Adoption proceedings. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure are not uby their 
nature clearly inapplicable" to adoption pro-
ceedings. Thiele v. Anderson, 1999 UT App 56, 
975 P.2d 481. 
Even if adoption proceedings are "special 
statutory proceedings" under Rule 81(a), Rule 
41(a)( 1) is not inherently "clearly inapplicable" 
to adoption proceedings. Thiele v. Anderson, 
1999 UT App 56, 975 P2d 481. 
City and justices' courts. 
Although Rule 55(a)(2) and Rule 5(a) provide 
that no service or notice need be served on a 
party in default, the time for appeal from a 
default judgment in a city court (now circuit 
court) ran from date of notice of entry of such 
judgment rather than from the date of judg-
ment. Buckner v. Main Realty & Ins. Co., 4 
Utah 2d 124, 288 P.2d 786 (1955) (but see Rule 
58A(d). 
Criminal proceedings. 
Former §§ 77-46-1 and 77-46-2 made this 
rule and the Rules of Civil Procedure pertain-
ing to discovery inapplicable to discovery in 
criminal cases. State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366 
(Utah 1974). 
Rule 52 applies to criminal actions. State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Defendant's "motion to reconsider" his sen-
tence could not be treated as a motion to alter 
or amend the judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 
59(e); because Utah R. Crim. P. 22 specifically 
applies to sentences, this rule makes Rule 59 
inapplicable. (Unpublished decision.) State v. 
McGuire, 2005 UT App 13. 
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malfeasance in office is a special statutory Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 R2d 12 (1961). 
action to which the Rules of Civil Procedure are 
applicable. State v. Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 Cited in National Adv. Co. v. Utah State Rd. 
P2d 12 (1961). Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 486 R2d 383 (1971); 
The taking of depositions pursuant to the Nelson v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 162, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in 506 R2d 437 (1973); RDG Associates/Jarman 
an action to remove a public official from office Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 741 P.2d 948 (Utah 
for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v. 1987); Brigham City v. Valencia, 779 R2d 1149 
Geurts, 11 Utah 2d 345, 359 P2d 12 (1961). (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Career Serv. Review Bd. 
Rule 65B(b) is "clearly inapplicable" to a v. Utah Dep't of Cors., 942 R2d 933 (Utah 
proceeding to remove a public official from office 1997); State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, 999 
for malfeasance pursuant to § 77-6-2. State v. R2d 1252. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions § 39. 
Rule 82. Jurisdiction and venue unaffected. 
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the 
courts of this state or the venue of actions therein. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is based on 
Rule 82, F.R.C.P. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — The Use Personam Jurisdiction, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 
of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) Sanction to Establish In 103. 
Rule 83. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Rule 83, authorizing rules by 
district courts, was repealed by order of the 
Supreme Court, effective May 1, 1991. 
Rule 84. Forms. 
The forms contained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the rules 
and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the 
rules contemplate. 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 84, F.R.C.P 
Rule 85. Title. 
These rules may be known and cited as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or 
abbreviated U.R.C.R 
Compiler's Notes . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 85, F.R.C.P. 
PART XII. FAMILY LAW 
Rule 100. Coordination of cases pending in district court 
and juvenile court. 
(a) Notice to the court In a case in which child custody, child support or 
parent time is an issue, all parties have a continuing duty to notify the court: 
(a)(1) of a case in which a party or the party's child is a party to or the Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
